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Organizational Psychology Review 2011 1: 293 originally published online 23 August 2011
DOI: 10.1177/2041386611409275

The online version of this article can be found at:
http://opr.sagepub.com/content/1/4/293
Manager responses to internal transfer attempts: Managerial orientation, social capital, and perceived benefits as predictors of assisting, hindering, or refraining

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Abstract
Internal job transfers are an understudied human resource practice. This paper addresses various antecedents of managerial action or inaction in response to an attempted transfer by a current employee. We integrate human and social capital theories with managerial agency, stewardship, and servant perspectives to reconcile inconsistencies involving human capital predictions in an internal-transfer context. Whereas a positive relationship between human capital and transfer likelihood is typically thought to exist, we argue that when internal transfers are considered, managerial orientation (agent, steward, or servant), managerial social capital (internal or external social capital), and the perception held by the manager regarding benefits or detriments of the transfer to the manager, organization, or workgroup members combine to affect managerial responses to transfer attempts (assisting, hindering, or refraining from intervening in the transfer attempts).

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Keywords
careers, employee—organization relationships, human resource management, leadership

Paper received 22 September 2010; revised version accepted 5 April 2011.

Introduction

The literature detailing the acquisition of human capital by organizations as well as the turnover of human capital from organizations is voluminous (e.g., Holtom, Mitchell, Lee, & Eberly, 2008; Ployhart, Weekley, & Baughman, 2006; Siebert & Zubanov, 2009; Weller, Matiaske, Holtom, & Mellewigt, 2009). Much less studied, however, is the nature of internal employee transfers that occur in organizations (Barber, 1998; Breaugh, 2008; Dalton, 1997). We define an internal transfer as having occurred when an employee in an organization leaves a current position and begins a new position at an equivalent level within the same organization, but working in a different workgroup for a different manager. The little work that has been accomplished in regard to internal transfers has tended to examine outcomes of transfers such as employee attitudes, coping strategies, stress and development, organizational flexibility, and reduced absenteeism and turnover among employees who are able to transfer freely (e.g., Armstrong-Stassen, 2003; Brett, 1984; Dalton & Todor, 1993; Feldman & Brett, 1983; Hippler, 2009; Moyle & Parkes, 1999; Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Hite, 1995).

Particularly interesting, however, is the tension that exists between potential benefits or detriments that might accrue to (a) the larger organization when certain employees transfer within the organization, (b) the local manager who stands to lose certain employees, and even (c) the potential transferee or workgroup members. From an organizational perspective, a transfer is distinct from traditional turnover. Traditional turnover is often viewed as dysfunctional because the organization as a whole loses the services of the departing employee (e.g., Cascio, 1991). Internal transfers can be beneficial to the organization insomuch as they might position employees more optimally in the organization. To the manager, however, the loss of an employee to transfer is akin to traditional turnover and is likely viewed as unfavorable (Dalton, 1997). Moreover, traditional turnover can be functional in the sense that it sometimes rids the organization of a poorly performing employee. Yet, as Dalton (1997, p. 412) aptly describes, the internal transfer equivalent may benefit the immediate workgroup, but may not benefit the organization as a whole:

It is certainly possible that the transfer of some individuals may greatly benefit the local, group, or unit level. Indeed, an account is often told about local supervisors who provide positive evaluations to facilitate employee transfer for those who are poor contributors. Presumably, few such transfers would similarly benefit the organization.

However, other authors have noted that certain organizational constraints may prevent this type of attempt to purge a workgroup of a poorly performing employee. For example, Ford, Keil, Bryman, Beardsworth, and Jenkins (1984, p. 41) quote from one of their sources, “Who’s going to recommend someone if I’m going to have them up in the office and say ‘What did you recommend her for?’”

This paper focuses specifically on internal-transfer processes by addressing various antecedents of managerial action or inaction in response to an attempted transfer by a current employee. Thus, we depart from previous work that has looked at the effects of transfers on employees, and instead focus on the actions (or inactions) managers might take in response
to transfer attempts. Specifically, we focus on what might be termed the pursuit stage, whereby a transfer candidate is already aware of another opportunity in the organization. At this stage, the potential transferee publicly indicates interest in and candidacy for a position and strives to be selected for the position by engaging in whatever selection process is required. Also, it is at this stage that the manager should have the most influence on the ultimate result of the transfer attempt (i.e., whether it will actually occur or be derailed in some way). We do not address processes that might occur during the information search stage, which comprises information search or awareness of a new position in another part of the organization by the employee. This stage is often undertaken discreetly before employees are compelled to make their intentions known to their current manager. Nor do we address the resolution stage, when employees are actually selected or not selected for other positions. Thus, we do not predict ultimate outcomes of transfer attempts but rather managers’ responses to such attempts. However, while we focus primarily on the pursuit stage, we recognize that throughout the transfer process, the employee’s current manager perceives the stakes involved in possibly losing that employee and may take steps to either hinder or advance the employee’s transfer attempt. We further assume that the transfer opportunity is being explored actively and voluntarily by the employee (as opposed to non-voluntary transfers, such as when an employee is deployed elsewhere in the organization due to poor performance or as an alternative to being laid off; Armstrong-Stassen, 2003).

Gaining a better understanding of intraorganizational job transfers and managerial responses to such transfers is important for several reasons. First, internal recruitment is a widely used human resource practice (e.g., Daft, 2010). Indeed, from the organization’s perspective, transfers are valuable for promoting employee career movement and growth, encouraging knowledge diffusion and exchange, avoiding employee displacement during organizational restructuring, and gaining a more flexible work force in case absence or turnover occurs (e.g., Noe & Barber, 1993). From an employee perspective, the benefits of job transfers include broadening one’s experience and skill repertoire, enhancing one’s career, decreasing job dissatisfaction, and gaining a broader view of the organization to enhance competence for generalist positions (e.g., London, 1991; Nelson & Quick, 2009). In addition, flatter, more horizontal organizational structures increase the importance of cross-training which is likely to occur through internal transfers.

Given these trends and given the potential benefits of intraorganizational transfers to organizations and employees alike, it is surprising that there is so little research on job transfers within organizations. Also surprising is the dearth of research that has examined managerial reactions and behaviors in the wake of potential employee mobility within organizations. Indeed, managers have varying embedded interests in retaining or releasing their employees. For example, recent research examining external employee mobility has suggested both benefits and drawbacks to relinquishing valued employees to turnover (Somaya, Williamson, & Lorinkova, 2008).

We focus specifically on three possible responses managers might have to employee internal-transfer attempts. First, managers might engage in an active response by assisting employees in attaining transfer opportunities. For example, managers might actively promote authentic strengths of employees wishing to transfer when talking with managers of other workgroups posting open positions. In contrast, managers might promote unauthentic strengths of employees in an attempt to rid themselves of these employees. Or, a manager might eagerly approve a requested transfer as a reward to an employee for their contributions and because the manager knows the transfer is in the best interest of the employee or the organization as a whole.

Second, the manager might also actively respond by trying to hinder the attempted
transfer, thereby retaining the employee in his or her workgroup. For example, managers might provide less-than-stellar recommendations or otherwise “leak” information that may damage the transfer efforts of employees. Also, in some organizations, workgroup managers must provide explicit approval for an internal transfer of one of their employees; thus managers might withhold such approval for their most valued employees in an attempt to retain them.

Finally, the manager might have reason to respond passively and essentially refrain from interceding in the transfer opportunity, adopting the mindset of “letting the chips fall how they may.” For example, whereas a manager may inwardly wish for the transfer of a nonvalued employee and look forward to the opportunity to replace that person with a newer, more valuable employee, various social constraints or concerns about potential detrimental effects on the organization may lead the manager to take a neutral or passive stance toward the attempted transfer. Although each of these responses may vary by degree (e.g., one manager might aggressively hinder a transfer attempt while another only partially hinders and otherwise refrains from interceding), we view these three responses as comprehensive and purposeful.

We discuss in this paper various antecedent conditions that prompt likely response patterns among managers faced with employee transfer attempts. Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical foundation that will guide this discussion. As shown, we believe that managerial orientation (agent, steward, or servant), managerial social capital (internal or external social capital), and the perception held by the manager regarding benefits or detriments of the transfer to the

![Figure 1. Conceptual model of managerial responses to internal transfer attempts](image)
manager, organization, or workgroup members culminate in either passive refraining on the part of the manager, or active assisting or hindering of the internal transfer attempt. We model Figure 1 similar to other conceptual work in organizational psychology that addresses likely reactions or behavior in the wake of certain antecedent conditions (e.g., the unfolding model of employee turnover; Lee, Mitchell, Holtom, McDaniel, & Hill, 1999; teammate responses to poor performers; e.g., LePine & van Dyne, 2001).

As shown in Figure 1, our framework incorporates managerial orientations that reflect different manager interests. First, an agency perspective views managers as pursuing short-term opportunism to satisfy individual utility (Davis, Frankforter, Vollrath, & Hill, 2007; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997a; Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, agent-managers are likely to protect themselves and their resources and assets in order to secure beneficial outcomes. Second, a stewardship perspective views managers as primarily seeking to attain the objectives of their organizations (Davis et al., 1997a). This perspective further assumes that managers will act with the interests of the organization as their top priority, meaning that self-interest and the interests of employees may be secondary to the superordinate interest of the organization. Finally, servant-managers are thought to selflessly serve others first (Liden, Wayne, Zhao, & Henderson, 2008). Liden et al. (2008) go on to define “putting subordinates first” as a subdimension on which we focus in this paper. Servant-managers will thus approach an employee transfer situation with that perspective as their guiding philosophy.

Next, we integrate managers’ informal relationships within organizations. These relationships can serve a variety of functions and might influence reactions to transfer attempts. First, the degree of social capital a manager possesses within the larger organization and within his or her specific workgroup suggests a level of implicit monitoring by others of the manager’s actions in response to a transfer attempt (e.g., Burt, 1992). Second, social capital also reflects potential levels of knowledge managers might possess regarding the likelihood of the transfer being beneficial to the organization as a whole (e.g., Burt, 1992). That is, given limits on the information available about potential transferees within an organization, a social network is an important information source and can be used to determine whether the transfer is in the best interest of the organization as a whole. Third, the social capital managers possess with workgroup members can also convey a level of trust (e.g., Coleman, 1990). The transfer of an employee can have ramifications for those coworkers remaining in the workgroup. A manager who has strong informal relationships to their subordinates will likely be able to detect the net effect of the transfer on subordinate attitudes in addition to having a good sense of what is best for the potentially transferring employee.

Given what is known about the three managerial orientations explored in this paper, we argue that these respective social capital functions will be more salient to managers with particular orientations. Specifically, given what is known about agent-managers, the monitoring function of social capital should be most salient to these managers because it may either accentuate or inhibit their ability to act in their best interests. For steward-managers, the information-gathering function of social capital should be most salient as a means of assessing the utility of the transfer for the organization as a whole. Finally, most critical to servant-managers is taking actions that are in the best interest of their workgroup members. Thus, trust established through social capital should be most salient as a means of assessing the utility of the transfer for the organization as a whole. Finally, most critical to servant-managers is taking actions that are in the best interest of their workgroup members. Thus, trust established through social capital will likely be the most salient social capital function for servant-managers and will play a major role in these managers’ decisions to assist, hinder, or refrain from interceding in employee transfer attempts.

The social capital perspective assumes that individuals are embedded in a network of interrelationships with others. This framework
thus provides a useful perspective with respect to the importance of a manager’s social relationships in ascertaining whether to assist with or hinder an internal transfer attempt as well as possible repercussions a manager might face should his or her attempts be perceived as counter to the good of the organization or workgroup to which the focal employee transfers. Furthermore, we differentiate between the social capital specifically generated from relationships with peer-managers (i.e., external sources) and that generated by relationships with subordinates (i.e., internal sources) in developing our arguments (e.g., Krackhardt & Stern, 1988; Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010).

Finally, according to a basic conceptualization of the human capital acquisition process, employees who possess higher perceived value are more likely to be selected into new positions in organizations whereas lower value employees will find it more difficult (Benowitz, 2008; Pomeroy, 2007). However, given various managerial orientations and social capital considerations introduced above, we challenge throughout the remainder of the paper this assumption that higher human capital always portends a higher likelihood of internal transfer. In this paper, we conceptualize employee value in terms of likely benefits or detriments the manager perceives are associated with the transfer. More specifically, perceived benefit refers to the perception held by the manager of the likely benefits or detriments to the focal interest most salient to that manager. That is, managers’ determination of benefits will likely be influenced by their orientation. Specifically, Figure 1 casts perceived benefits in terms of the value proposition most relevant to a given managerial orientation. For agents, this determination of benefits or detriments of transfers revolves around perceived benefits to the manager him or herself. For stewards, this determination revolves around perceived benefits or detriments of the transfer to the larger organization. For servants, the determination stems from perceived benefits or detriments to their workgroup members. We turn next to discussing the theoretical background relevant to managerial orientation, social capital, and perceived benefit contingencies. We then develop specific testable propositions based on combinations illustrated in Figure 1. Finally, we discuss several potential boundary conditions, implications, and suggestions for future research.

Theoretical background and proposition development

Managerial perspective: Agency, stewardship, and servant-manager orientations

As previously suggested, a tension exists between the benefits of internal transfers to employees or organizations on the one hand and the potential losses incurred by individual workgroups who stand to lose valued members on the other (e.g., Dalton, 1997). This suggests incentives for managers to retain valued workgroup members, even when the transfer of such employees may be a more functional outcome for employees or the organization as a whole. Specifically, managers might have particular incentives to retain valued employees, given that retaining them is likely to sustain the success of the workgroup and thus the power and relative standing of that manager in the broader organization. Similarly, there may be incentives to facilitate the transfer of nonvaluable employees out of the workgroup. However, managers might be driven by other interests, including those of the larger organization or the employees in their stead.

These examples map broadly onto three primary orientations of managers as group leaders or organizational representatives. First, agency theory details a control approach taken by the manager, with roots in economics (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). According to the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932), a central aspect of corporate governance is the
separation of owners and managers, which provides a foundation for agency theory. The key argument of agency theory is that the interests of managers are likely to diverge from those of owners or the company as a whole (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003). As agents, managers are individually oriented and self-serving rather than collectively oriented and pro-organizational or pro-employee. They are motivated to maximize their own utility, possibly at the expense of their organizations or workgroup members, based on economic rationality and attempts to increase opportunities to achieve their individual goals (Davis et al., 1997a). As such, they are more likely to engage in opportunistic behavior, which may negatively impact organizational or employee interests.

In our context, this suggests that agent-managers might engage in tactics aimed at trying to purge nonvalued employees from their workgroups, even at the potential expense of the organization or transferee. It also suggests tactics aimed at trying to retain valued employees in their workgroups, even when the internal transfer of such employees would likely be in the best interest of the employee or organization as a whole. Specifically, if the manager allows valued employees to transfer to other workgroups, the power of the manager’s workgroup will be reduced. Moreover, the power of the workgroups to which employees transfer may increase, resulting in further relative disadvantage to the workgroup from which these employees transfer.

A second alternative explanation of leadership behavior is stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997a; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). A stewardship orientation suggests a collaborative approach and depicts managers as stewards whose interests are consistent with those of owners. They behave in pro-organizational ways rather than self-serving and individualistic ways (Martynov, 2009). Stewards are thought to identify with their organization, internalize its vision and mission, and align their motives with organizational objectives. According to stewardship theory, the manager may place emphasis on cooperating with and accepting the goals of the organization. This may occur even when the personal interest of the manager and the interests of the organization conflict, or when the manager’s interest in his or her employees and the organization’s interests conflict. Advocates of this theory stress the importance of empowering stewards because stewards are not motivated by individual goals and always seek to attain organizational objectives (Dalton et al., 2003; Davis et al., 1997a). In our context, if employee internal-job transfers are thought to help the company, a steward-manager will be more likely to promote these transfer attempts, even if such transfers hurt the manager and his or her workgroup from a human capital loss perspective. For example, steward-managers may see the benefits to the larger organization of preventing employees from quitting (e.g., by allowing them to transfer internally to a more desirable job; Dalton & Todor, 1993), or simply allowing employees to move to places in the organization where they will be able to better contribute to overall organizational performance.

Although the two perspectives above stress different characteristics of leader behavior, motivation, and goals (Thorgren, Wincent, & Anokhin, 2010), they both focus on enhanced performance, possibly at the expense of employee well-being. Agency theory emphasizes the improvement of workgroup performance to fulfill managers’ individual needs while stewardship theory emphasizes the enhancement of organizational performance. However, the leadership literature has broadly suggested two classes of leadership behavior: productivity- and employee-focused (Daft, 2010). If we consider agent- and steward-managers to be productivity-focused, a more complete classification should also comprise employee-focused managers. Specifically, servant leadership, a third managerial orientation we incorporate in our framework, suggests that some leaders desire to selflessly serve others first (Greenleaf, 1977;
Liden et al., 2008). Liden et al. (2008) further define “putting subordinates first” as a subdimension of servant leadership that we adopt, given our subordinate internal-transfer context. Servant-managers are more likely to feel a moral obligation to care for, develop, and constitute trust with their subordinates (Liden et al., 2008). They behave in the best interest of their employees, put people first, and value their employees more than their own well-being, workgroup results, or even organizational success (Han, Kakabadse, & Kakabadse, 2009; Walumbwa, Hartnell, & Oke, 2010). As such, the focus of servant leadership is not the workgroup as a unit or the organization but rather the workgroup members themselves. Because the primary aim of servant leadership is increased service to employees, a servant leader has “the tremendous responsibility to do everything within his or her power to nurture the personal, professional, and spiritual growth of employees” (Greenleaf, 1998, p. 7).

In this vein, a servant-manager is more likely to be committed to the growth and development of individual subordinates, even if internal transfers of such subordinates might jeopardize the personal interests of the manager or the organization as a whole.

We characterize the agent, steward, and servant managerial orientations as quasi-trait related to individual managers, such that they are expected to be relatively stable across time for individual managers within their organizational/environmental settings, yet subject to variations depending on certain environmental factors. This follows from Davis et al.’s (1997a) discussion, in which they identify both psychological and environmental antecedents of one’s propensity to act as either an agent or steward in an organizational setting. Liden et al. (2008) also cast servant leadership as more stable, but still subject to training and improvement. Thus, different managers within the same organization can have different orientations, and these individual orientations can shift if sufficiently strong environmental influences materialize (e.g., change in compensation system or organizational culture; Davis et al., 1997a).

Furthermore, we classify managers as tending to primarily adopt one of these orientations, while recognizing that the orientations are not necessarily completely orthogonal and that managers might possess a tendency toward more than one orientation in a given situation. For example, some transfer situations might allow a manager to simultaneously be pro-organization (stewardship) and pro-employee (servant). However, in most cases we believe that these orientations are distinct (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997b) and a manager will act in accordance with their primary orientation. Finally, we focus on these three orientations while acknowledging the possibility of additional orientations (e.g., Blake & Mouton’s [1985] taxonomy comprises five primary managerial types).2

**Social capital perspective: Social capital of the manager**

Coleman (1990) posits that social capital is a property of social structure that is able to create value and facilitate the actions of people within the structure. Similar to the creation of physical capital that involves changes in materials, and the development of human capital that involves improvements in a person’s knowledge and skills, social capital occurs when social relationships among people bring about changes that facilitate people’s actions (Coleman, 1990). Researchers in social networks have taken the lead in developing and examining theories that pertain to social capital (e.g., Adler & Kwon, 2002; Brass & Krackhardt, 1999; Lin, Cook, & Burt, 2001). A social network can be defined as the pattern of ties that link a certain set of individuals where each individual is described in terms of his or her relationships with others in the network (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982).3 Coleman (1988) discusses how social norms are developed and enforced particularly well in networks with high closure (i.e., the people to whom one is informally tied are
themselves tied to each other). Burt (1992) argues that networks characterized by high closure will be rife with information redundancy and not allow for the control of information by any one party. Soon, all parties in a “closed” network will learn about the actions of any given member of the network which can either help or damage the reputation of that member.

In our context, an important characteristic of one’s informal relationships is whether those relationships tend to be more internal to one’s workgroup (internal social capital) or external to one’s workgroup (external social capital) (Gould & Fernandez, 1989; Krackhardt & Stern, 1988; Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010). Specifically, social capital is considered from the perspective of the amount of embeddedness a manager has in the informal networks of other managers (external social capital) or workgroup members (internal social capital). This level of embeddedness can create benefits like norms, trust, reciprocity, or information access (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988). It can also create constraints and perceptions of accountability that may limit the behaviors available to the manager (Burt, 1992).

For example, when an employee desires to transfer, the employee’s manager may feel accountability and pressure from their informal relationships to respond in certain ways. This may occur regardless of the ability of individuals comprising those informal relationships to actually formally reward or punish the manager. Managers who have even a few ties into closed peer networks may feel accountable to act either in the best interest of the entire organization or to help out a fellow manager by being honest with them about the employee’s qualifications because word of their actions in response to the transfer attempt will spread quickly. Similarly, if managers have many ties into a sparse peer network, they may feel constraint because they have developed relationships with many of their peers. At the same time, they may have access to a broad array of information. Conversely, when managers are even slightly embedded in dense informal networks primarily with their subordinates (internal social capital) they face a different set of norms to do what is best for that group or the individual requesting the transfer. By definition, lower embeddedness with either of these two constituencies (peer managers or workgroup members) suggests the manager may feel less constrained by the constituency in which the manager is less embedded. At the same time, the manager may also have access to less information from those sources.

Recall that earlier we discussed at least three mechanisms or functions through which social capital may influence one’s actions. These three functions are linked to the three primary managerial orientations introduced above. Although managers of each orientation may focus on these social capital functions to different degrees, we assert that they will be primarily concerned with the function most related to their orientation. Specifically, because agent-managers tend to act opportunistically and in their own best interests, they should be particularly cognizant of how these actions may be viewed or monitored by peer managers who are in a position to impart repercussions on the opportunistic agent. Agent-managers with primarily external social capital will be more subject to this monitoring than those with primarily internal social capital and thus more likely constrained from acting opportunistically.

Second, steward-managers wish to ensure that their actions benefit the greater organization. Thus, their primary focus will be on social capital’s function of providing access to diverse pools of information that might otherwise remain untapped (Burt, 1992). Steward-managers with primarily internal social capital will not have as much information about the broader organization and will likely have a more difficult time determining the ramifications of a transfer to the organization.

Third, servant-managers primarily serve others and build trust with their employees
(Liden et al., 2008), suggesting they are most interested in the trust that can be conveyed through social capital (Coleman, 1988). When a servant-manager has primarily internal social capital, their employees are more likely to trust that the manager’s actions regarding the transfer are taken with the best interests of the employees in mind. A servant-manager with primarily external social capital may lack this trust with subordinates and be in a more challenging position to take actions such as hindering a transfer attempt.

Finally, it should be noted that a manager’s internal and external social capital does not exist separately in a vacuum; rather they are two sides of a ledger. Managers will have either greater relative internal or greater relative external social capital that will influence their ability to take certain actions. For instance, a manager may have fewer ties to external peers (relative to internal workgroup members) but still be more constrained by the group of external peers if those peers’ patterns of relationships are very dense, because information would spread very quickly. Additionally, if a manager has many internal ties relative to external ties, their information search process may be limited given the lower relative amount of organization-wide information to which they have access. Finally, because the ability to form relationships is not limitless given the time they take to develop and maintain, managers will tend to have established greater trust either with peer managers or workgroup members. Those establishing strong trust with multiple groups usually end up in a stressful position where they must choose a side or potentially lose both sets of relationships (Krackhardt, 1999). While it is technically possible for managers to be at equilibrium, this is highly unlikely given the mathematics behind the measurement of internal and external social capital. As is the case with any continuous variable, managers that are near equilibrium will be less likely to behave consistently. However, the greater the imbalance of internal and external social capital, the stronger its likely effects on transfer attempt responses.

Human capital perspective: Perceived benefits or detriments of the transfer

As indicated earlier, the predominant theoretical approach to examining the consequences of recruitment and selection at the organizational level is human capital theory (Becker, 1962; Schultz, 1961). This theory implies that organizational success is a function of the accumulation of valuable human capital. More specific to internal processes in organizations, human capital can also be viewed as a primary determinant of workgroup productivity. In fact, when considering internal-transfer processes, workgroups might be considered individual “organizations” that accumulate or lose human capital as members join or leave the workgroup. In turn, workgroup productivity likely declines when a member possessing a high level of human capital transfers to another workgroup.

Whereas some aspects of human capital are easily quantifiable (i.e., education, experience, cognitive ability), what is unclear are the values that a manager places on each of these facets of human capital. In addition, managers frequently rely on beliefs or hunches to determine how valuable an employee might be in another part of the organization or how detrimental it might be to lose an employee to an internal transfer. The person–environment (PE) fit literature (see Kristof-Brown & Guay, 2010, for a review) exemplifies the complexity of the process of assessing employees’ human capital. Managers not only rely on how an individual’s knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) match the demands of a current or prospective job (demands–abilities fit) but also how “workgroup-specific” those KSAs are and how the employee’s values match those of their current or prospective coworkers (person–group fit) or the values of the organization as a whole (person–organization fit). Finally, in addition to the
human capital and fit of a potential transferee, employees possess social capital which astute managers realize can be an important determinant of how valuable the employee might be to the performance and morale of the workgroup or even the whole organization. For example, an employee with many ties in the organization will likely have a stronger reputation in the organization, and thus will be perceived as valuable to the current workgroup.

Two primary problems arise when trying to measure human capital. First, managers often rely on perceptions of employees’ human capital rather than calculating a virtual infinite regress of variables. This is similar to holistic perceptions used to assess PE fit (e.g., Cable & Judge, 1996; Dineen, Ash, & Noe, 2002; Judge & Cable, 1997) or even performance (e.g., Frayne & Geringer, 2000; Turnipseed & Rassuli, 2005). Second, managers’ perceptions of employee human capital might be influenced by those managers’ orientations. Thus, instead of artificially specifying what will be considered most or least important in a manager’s assessment of a potentially transferring employee’s human capital, we make propositions regarding the perceived benefits or detriments of a transfer. Specifically, we suggest that this perceived benefit calculus is associated with managerial orientation. For example, although managers may try to more holistically calculate benefits or detriments of a transfer, an agent-manager will primarily assess the benefits or detriments the transfer brings to the manager him/herself. A steward-manager will primarily assess whether the transfer brings a net benefit to the larger organization. One unit may be disadvantaged and another advantaged, but provided the net result benefits the overall organization, the steward-manager will consider it beneficial and respond accordingly (e.g., if the receiving unit is “taking on” a poorer performer for the overall good of the organization). Finally, a servant-manager will primarily assess the net benefit or detriment of the transfer to workgroup members, including the transferee.

Further, this benefits perception might comprise anything from a judgment of how replaceable the employee is to the personal relationship the manager has with the employee (leader–member exchange; e.g., Lam, Huang, & Snape, 2007; Sparrowe, Soetjipto, & Kraimer, 2006), to past performance of the employee or even the size of the department and thus relative contribution of that employee to overall workgroup performance. However, when considering net benefits or detriments, managers will consider benefits accrued to their stakeholder of primary interest (agent: self; steward: organization; servant: workgroup members). In turn, the perceived benefit of a transfer should differentially affect managerial propensity to respond in certain ways to an employee transfer attempt.

**Combined perspectives: Managerial response propositions**

Taken together and in accordance with Figure 1, the aforementioned perspectives can be combined to generate propositions regarding likely managerial responses to an internal transfer attempt by an employee in that manager’s workgroup. As shown, these comprise active (assist or hinder the transfer attempt) and passive (refrain from interceding in the transfer attempt) responses. Beginning at the top of Figure 1, we first discuss transfer attempts of employees who work for managers best characterized as having an agency managerial orientation, linking those transfer attempt scenarios to likely managerial responses.

**Agent-managers.** To best serve their self interests, agent-managers will focus on maintaining the appropriate stock of valuable employees (Davis et al., 1997a). Not having those employees’ personal interests as a priority, these managers will tend to view employees as dispensable and replaceable if the employees
are not thought to be contributing to unit productivity and performance. Thus, agents will be interested in purging from the workgroup any employees viewed as having low value to the manager. Similarly, they will be highly focused on retaining employees perceived to have high value, regardless of the potential benefits that transfers of high-value employees might bring to the organization or the employees themselves.

Thus, when an employee with low value to the agent-manager indicates an interest in transferring to another part of the organization, the manager’s first reaction will likely be to assist in this effort. When a high-value employee indicates interest in transferring, the agent-manager is likely to want to thwart such an attempt and retain the services of that high-value employee. Recall though that agent-managers are likely to be highly attuned to the monitoring function of their social capital. Based on this, we predict that an agent-manager’s social capital in the organization may either enhance the likelihood of moving ahead with efforts to assist, or may deter such efforts. Assisting the transfer attempts of employees with low value to the manager is most likely among agent-managers with fewer ties to external peers or constituents in the organization and greater numbers of ties to internal workgroup members. Specifically, a manager’s attempt to promote the transfer of a low-value employee is less likely to be discovered and sanctioned by external constituents if that manager has greater internal relative to external social capital. Similarly, hindrance tactics and eventual prevention of a transfer of a high-value employee is less likely to be discovered and sanctioned by individuals outside of the workgroup if the agent-manager has primarily internal social ties to workgroup members. Taken together, this suggests the following two propositions:

Proposition 1: Agent-managers with greater internal relative to external social capital will assist employee transfer attempts when those managers perceive that the transfers will be beneficial to themselves.

Proposition 2: Agent-managers with greater internal relative to external social capital will hinder employee transfer attempts when those managers perceive that the transfers will be detrimental to themselves.

All else being equal, a different response to employee transfer attempts is expected when a manager’s ties are primarily external to the workgroup rather than internal to the workgroup. Specifically, when an agent-manager’s social ties are primarily with other managers in other parts of the organization (i.e., professional peers), those peer managers have a greater vantage point from which to monitor and evaluate the actions of the manager in question. Should that manager assist the transfer of a low-value employee to another workgroup for the manager’s own benefit, or, to avoid harm to him or herself, prevent the transfer of a high-value employee, these actions could be monitored and eventually sanctioned by fellow managers (Burt, 1992). Given the salience of the external monitoring function of social capital to an agent-manager, that manager will not actively try to prevent a high-value employee from transferring, nor actively assist a low-value employee. Thus:

Proposition 3: Agent-managers with greater external relative to internal social capital will refrain from interceding in employee transfer attempts regardless of whether they perceive that the transfers will be beneficial or detrimental to themselves.

Steward-managers. Next, we consider the likely responses of steward-managers to employee transfer attempts. As previously reviewed, steward-managers designate the overall good of the organization as their top priority and will take actions in accordance with this priority (Davis et al., 1997a). Moreover, information gathering is likely the most salient function of
social capital to steward-managers, ostensibly so they can best assess what is optimal for the organization. Thus, steward-managers will not be as concerned with being monitored, most likely because they are already acting in accordance with the organization’s best interests. Thus, their primary concern in the wake of a transfer attempt will be to try to assess the potential overall benefit of that transfer to the organization, irrespective of potential benefits or detriments to individual workgroup members or the manager him/herself.

However, not being well connected to other constituencies in the organization, steward-managers with greater internal relative to external social capital will have a more difficult time collecting sufficient information with which to assess the overall good of the transfer to the organization (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). When the manager perceives the transferee to have high value, their transfer may initially seem beneficial to the organization. However, the manager must weigh this perceived value assessment against the effects on his or her workgroup of losing the valuable employee, in terms of how the net result might negatively impact overall organizational performance. Similarly, while initially the manager might view the transfer of a low-value employee out of the workgroup to be beneficial to the workgroup, and thus overall organizational performance, this assessment must be made along with an unsure assessment of how the low-value employee’s transfer might degrade overall organizational performance via lowered performance of the workgroup to which the employee transfers. Given this level of ambiguity caused by a lack of information about the impact on the broader organization, we propose the following response:

Proposition 4: Steward-managers with greater internal relative to external social capital will refrain from interceding in employee transfer attempts regardless of whether they believe that the transfers will be beneficial or detrimental to the organization.

Conversely, when a steward-manager’s social capital is more external, the manager likely has a better sense of the value of the employee not only in the manager’s immediate workgroup, but also his or her value to the organization as a whole. Thus, when a steward-manager with greater external social capital perceives a net detriment of the transfer to the organization, the manager will actively strive to prevent the transfer from proceeding, in the interest of preventing potential detriments to performance in the broader organization.

Similar logic suggests that a steward-manager with greater external social capital will perceive a net benefit of an employee requesting a transfer only if that transfer is thought to be beneficial to the organization as a whole. The manager is able to make this assessment because of available information via their social capital (Burt, 1992). Thus, despite the prospect of losing this employee from his or her immediate workgroup, such a manager with sufficient information to see the potential value to the organization as a whole will be more confident in this assessment. Given their tendency to promote organizational goals over employee- or self-interest, this suggests:

Proposition 5: Steward-managers with greater external relative to internal social capital will assist employee transfer attempts when those managers perceive that such transfers will be beneficial to the organization.

Proposition 6: Steward-managers with greater external relative to internal social capital will hinder employee transfer attempts when those managers perceive that such transfers will be detrimental to the organization.

Servant-managers. Rather than prioritizing the interests of the organization or their own self-interest, servant-managers are thought to prioritize the interests of their workgroup members, and find the trust development function of social capital to be most salient (e.g., Liden et al., 2008). Thus, when employees desire an
internal transfer, servant-managers are likely to oblige and support the effort by endorsing the candidacy of the employee for the desired position and champion that employee through the internal selection process, provided the net benefit to the employee and other workgroup members is positive. Because the manager is most concerned with promoting transfers that would have a net benefit to workgroup members and hindering those that do not, the manager may actually be eager to assist an employee’s transfer attempt for employees who are perceived to have either high or low value. For instance, if a high-value employee would likely benefit from the transfer to a new department, a servant-manager would typically assist in the transfer attempt. However, for a lower value employee, the manager may still have reasons to believe that promoting a transfer would be in the best interest of the employee. For example, a lower value employee may just need a new situation to be able to thrive, or the removal of a lower value employee from the workgroup might have a net positive effect on remaining workgroup members.

Thus, it is apparent that servant-managers must sometimes balance the benefits to potential transferees against the potential harm or decreased functioning or morale of remaining workgroup members. While most cases will result in a win–win or lose–lose for the transferee and other workgroup members, sometimes a transfer might help the employee but harm the remaining workgroup members, such as the transfer of an informal leader. In these cases the manager must consider the net benefit (or detriment) to the employee and workgroup members before acting. For instance, if the manager has established trust with the workgroup (via greater internal social capital) and sees the transfer as beneficial there is no reason not to assist in the transfer as this action will likely be seen positively and understood by the workgroup. This suggests:

Proposition 7: Servant-managers with greater internal relative to external social capital will assist employee transfer attempts when those managers perceive that such transfers will be beneficial to their workgroup members.

Conversely, when a servant-manager feels that a transfer would be to the net detriment of workgroup members, it introduces a dilemma for the manager who wants to oblige the potential transferee’s request on one hand but also does not want to disadvantage remaining workgroup members. That is, ultimately the servant-manager may decide that an employee is likely to be unsuccessful in another position within the organization and may therefore actively try to prevent the employee from executing the transfer. Also, as mentioned before, the manager may see the loss of the employee as potentially damaging to the workgroup as a whole. We argue that a decision to actually hinder the transfer attempt will hinge on the manager’s level of internal social capital. Specifically, a servant-manager who has greater internal social capital likely has a greater level of trust established with subordinates, given the accumulation of ties in his or her workgroup. Thus, the manager’s actions might be better understood as being in the best interest of the employee and/or workgroup members. In addition, if the employee who is being hindered from transferring expresses displeasure to his or her workgroup members over the manager’s actions, the social capital between the manager and those other members will likely buffer against such expressions and perhaps even convince the employee that the manager is looking out for them. Therefore, managers with greater internal social capital may feel better equipped to practice “tough love” in discouraging the transfer attempts of employees when such attempts are thought to have a net detriment on them and other workgroup members:

Proposition 8: Servant-managers with greater internal relative to external social capital will hinder employee transfer attempts when those
managers perceive that such transfers will be detrimental to their workgroup members.

Despite being employee-focused, a servant-manager may have greater external social capital relative to internal social capital and thus be more focused on maintaining external relationships with peer managers in the organization rather than maintaining close internal ties with subordinates. For example, a sales manager may care very deeply about the salespeople in his or her sales team. Yet that manager may very plausibly have more day-to-day interaction with fellow sales managers at corporate headquarters (who are also likely tied to each other) than to their salespeople. Even if managers have primarily external social capital and less established trust with their subordinates, they will be particularly likely to assist the transfer attempts of employees when they view the transfer as have a net benefit for workgroup members. Two factors suggest the likelihood of assisting with the transfer in this situation. First, the general inclination of a servant-manager is to do what they feel is best for their employees which would push the manager toward assisting the transfer. Second, the servant-manager would likely strive to have more positive internal relationships with workgroup members. Explicitly assisting the transfer may be a step in the direction of building greater internal social capital with those who remain in the workgroup. Therefore:

**Proposition 9:** Servant-managers with greater external relative to internal social capital will assist employee transfer attempts when those managers perceive that such transfers will be beneficial to their workgroup members.

Finally, even if a servant-manager thinks that a transfer might bring a net detriment to the employee and other workgroup members, if the manager has greater external relative to internal social capital, the manager does not likely have the infrastructure of workgroup trust and support necessary to practice “tough love” with the potential transferee. Specifically, by hindering in this case, such a manager risks losing any social capital they do have with employees, as this action is likely to be interpreted in many different ways without much opportunity for the manager to defend him/herself or rely on preestablished trust. Servant-managers with greater external social capital will thus likely be inhibited from doing what they think is best because of the uncertainty surrounding workgroup member reactions. It is also unlikely that servant-managers will actively assist transfers they view as detrimental as this too could have long-term negative ramifications. For instance, if the employee fails in the new position or the workgroup becomes less cohesive the manager might be blamed if they actively assisted the transfer. Thus, hindering risks decreasing what little trust exists between the manager and workgroup members while assisting could prove equally problematic. Cumulatively, this suggests:

**Proposition 10:** Servant-managers with greater external relative to internal social capital will refrain from interceding in employee transfer attempts when those managers perceive that such transfers will be detrimental to their workgroup members.

**Potential boundary conditions**

The propositions developed above are subject to certain boundary conditions which create opportunities to further develop theory in this area. While an exhaustive discussion of all possibilities is beyond the scope of this paper, we identify in this section four primary categories of moderating variables and provide several examples of how our propositions might be altered under these conditions. First, **job factors** are relevant given that managers may lead workgroups that perform different types of work. For example, in terms of how specific job requirements tend to be (e.g., how mechanistic versus organic the job is; Morgan, 2007), a manager’s ability to assess “perceived
benefits” (to him or herself, to the organization, or to workgroup members) may vary, and thus may carry less weight when jobs in question are more organic. Also, the degree to which the job is “specialized” (i.e., only one or two of them in an organization, such as head of public relations) versus more of a “commodity” (e.g., salesperson) may make it more or less difficult to assess perceived benefits as well as gain accurate information about the likely success of a transferee in a new position.

Second, business unit factors refer to collective characteristics of the workgroup, which might include group cohesiveness, conflict, and interdependence, as well as the criticality of the business unit in the larger organization. For example, a steward-manager may evaluate the criticality of his or her business unit and the business unit to which the employee wants to transfer. This evaluation might influence his or her response.

Third, organization factors might include the prevailing organizational culture; for example, whether it is more collective or individualistic, and whether this alters opportunistic behavior or degrees of internal versus external social capital. Finally, our propositions imply equivalently “platonic” ties between focal managers and other managers in the organization. However, certain managerial-tie factors could alter our propositions. For example, a potentially important managerial-tie boundary is whether the manager of the current and new workgroup themselves share a personal tie. For example, even an agent-manager may be willing to allow a transfer of a personally valued employee if it is to a workgroup headed by a personal friend. Or, in the case of negative ties, a steward-manager may distrust information gleaned from such ties, reducing the effect of external social capital if many such ties exist.

Discussion

Internal job transfers are a broadly used human resource management solution to workforce planning that avert the need for oftentimes more costly and time-consuming external recruitment and selection processes. Our theoretical model begins to address the current deficiency in the literature that exists with regard to managerial action or inaction that might occur in the wake of employee transfer attempts. In particular, our model incorporates some of the perspectives that we believe are most influential in the internal job transfer process, including human capital theory, social capital theory, as well as agency, stewardship, and servant-managerial orientations. It specifically contributes to the extant literature by introducing and examining managerial responses that result from the combination of these factors.

Specifically, when employees indicate a desire to internally transfer, we have suggested three possible responses a manager might exhibit. These responses are predicated to occur depending on the perceived benefit of the transfer in question, managerial orientation, and the degree to which the manager tends to possess internal or external social capital. The combination of these characteristics results in several interesting propositions that are ripe for future investigation. For example, we have argued that highly valued employees may not necessarily find it easier to attain desired internal transfers, as human capital theory would suggest. Rather, their transfer attempts might for example be hindered by an agent-manager focused on retaining personally beneficial employees in the workgroup for his or her long-term advantage. Thus our suggestion that high human capital may actually be a hindrance to one’s likelihood of transfer (i.e., when working for an agent-manager who is seeking to maximize their own benefit) runs counter to traditional conceptualizations of human capital as an enhancer of one’s chances of being selected for vacant positions. Conversely, a manager may not always be quick to encourage the transfer of an employee perceived to be a detriment to that manager, especially if that manager tends to give priority to the interests and
success of the overall organization (i.e., a steward-manager) or if the manager perceives monitoring constraints emanating from a strong external network of social ties in the organization (i.e., an agent-manager). These are but a few of the possible scenarios that emerge from our model and propositions.

In addition to building on the human capital and managerial orientation literatures (e.g., Dalton et al., 2003; Davis et al., 1997a; Greenleaf, 1998; Schultz, 1961), our model incorporates the role of managerial social capital in the internal-transfer process. Whereas most job placement-related models that incorporate social capital do so by examining how job seeker social capital is associated with greater job seeker knowledge of position opportunities (e.g., Granovetter, 1973), we conceptualize social capital in this paper as a vehicle by which a manager’s actions might be monitored by those to whom he or she is tied. A manager might also attain knowledge of the possible benefits and risks to the transferred employee and to the organization associated with allowing a transfer to materialize, or a manager might develop and maintain trust with workgroup members. A particular contribution of this paper is mapping these social capital functions onto the three managerial orientations. For example, a steward-manager, most concerned with the information-gathering function of social capital, might withhold support for a transfer if he or she has sound information from a stronger external network of ties regarding how the transfer might hurt rather than help the organization as a whole. While more formal mechanisms exist for gathering information about potential benefits or drawbacks of a transfer to the organization (e.g., reading position descriptions), informal information is a valuable and often-used source (Brass, 1995). An agent-manager, most concerned with external monitoring of his or her actions, might refrain from interceding in transfer attempts if he or she perceives likely sanctions following a more active but self-interested response.

With certain modifications, the framework offered in this paper might be generalizable to a host of additional organizational phenomena where the confluence of managerial or employee orientation and social capital may lead to assisting, hindering, or refraining responses. For example, whenever top-management teams set forth policies, develop mission statements, and so forth in an attempt to bring about organizational change, middle managers can assist with developing “buy-in” among lower level employees, can hinder such attempts (e.g., by making disparaging remarks; e.g., “Folks, here is the latest and greatest mission statement from upstairs – take it for what it’s worth!”), or take an apathetic stance and refrain from promoting or hindering the proposed change. These responses may depend on managerial orientation, and the degree to which these attempts may “work” or not may hinge on these managers’ social capital in the organization. Similarly, human resource management’s (HRM) acceptance in the larger organization may hinge on whether line managers tend to hinder, assist, or refrain from intervening in the actions of HR managers. For example, does HRM’s “reputation” in the organization hinge on line managers’ orientation, their social capital, and thus their responses to HRM initiatives and implementation attempts? (e.g., Becker & Huselid, 2006). Conversely, HR managers themselves may act as agents, stewards, or servants in assisting, hindering, or refraining from promoting organizational policies. Such behavior may also stem from their level of social capital in the organization.

Additional literatures might also be enriched by our approach. For example, in the socialization area, when a workgroup gains a new member, current members may assist the socialization of that new member, hinder that new member, or refrain from engaging either way. Again, this could be a function of employee orientation (e.g., agent, steward) and social capital. The social undermining (e.g., hindering coworkers or managers; e.g., Duffy,
Ganster, & Pagon, 2002), employee voice (e.g., agent-managers may hinder employee voice when they have greater internal social capital and perceive that suggestions hurt their personal interests; e.g., Detert, & Treviño, 2010), and business ethics (e.g., fulfilling self-interests by harming others; e.g., Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005) literatures also might benefit from considering the framework we provide.

Future research directions

Our framework provides a useful starting point from which to continue examining issues related to the internal-transfer process as well as broader issues we have proposed. However, in addition to the boundary condition categories already identified, there are several issues that fell outside the scope of this initial work that should be subjected to future theory development and research. First, we only focus on likely managerial responses to transfer attempts. We do not go as far as discussing the ultimate results of these efforts. Future research may investigate whether or not these actions will ultimately work. For example, power and politics among potential transfer stakeholders could taint the accuracy of a manager’s response (e.g., a steward-manager may be falsely led to believe that assisting an employee transfer would benefit the organization). More generally, preferences of organizational leaders or other managers who want to incorporate an employee into their workgroups may affect whether the focal manager’s efforts will work (e.g., a manager may try to hinder, but may ultimately fail because the manager of another workgroup tries and ultimately succeeds in “luring” the transferee). However inaccurate or accurate the perceptions of ultimate benefit or detriment are, we maintain that managers will use these perceptions to shape their responses to transfer attempts.

Second, we focus on the pursuit stage whereby an employee is already aware of another opportunity in the organization and publicly indicates interest in and candidacy for the position. The other stages in the internal-transfer process such as information search and resolution also deserve future attention. Take the information search stage as an example. Employee social capital likely plays a role as an employee desiring a transfer seeks information about potential openings in the organization. An agent-manager thus may not be forthcoming about potential opportunities and may not divulge those opportunities to a valuable employee who he or she suspects is interested in transferring. However, an employee with high external social capital might not need to rely on the manager to divulge information about open positions in other parts of the organization. Although this is a plausible scenario, we do acknowledge that more and more organizations have moved to open internal recruiting systems (e.g., company intranets) where employees have greater access to information on transfers.

Third, although we consider internal transfers to positions at equivalent levels in organizations, we believe that our conceptual model also applies to internal promotions; that is, a higher level position in another workgroup within the same organization. Although promotions may be more attractive to employees than transfers, managerial responses to promotion attempts should be quite similar to those of lateral transfer attempts. For example, agent-managers with greater internal relative to external social capital will assist the promotions that provide benefits to them while hindering the promotions that are detrimental to them. This is because these assistance or hindrance tactics are less likely to be discovered and sanctioned by external constituents if the manager has greater internal relative to external social capital.

Fourth, characteristics of the manager who might be receiving the transferring employee may also warrant further attention, particularly in studies that explore the success or failure of transfer attempts. For instance, if the manager receiving the transfer has many relationships to
other managers this may influence the actions of the focal manager in several ways. An agent may be careful not to “cross” a manager with a high level of social capital for fear of repercussions. Agents or stewards may see the transfer as an opportunity to tap into the other manager’s robust network, which may influence their actions. In general, we recognize that political posturing among any of the stakeholders affected by an internal transfer may play a role in a manager’s ultimate response tendencies. However, that manager’s perceived benefit calculus will continue to be geared toward his or her primary interest (self, organization, or workgroup members), and we assume the manager accounts for any salient power or politics considerations he or she is aware of.

Next, the longer versus shorter term benefits of managerial actions should be explored, perhaps in the context of managerial time orientation (Thoms & Greenberger, 1995). For example, although agent-managers might be commonly associated with shorter term time orientations (e.g., taking any action necessary to ensure expedient results), some agent-managers may also be more strategic in their decisions to ensure personal success in the longer term. This phenomenon is discussed by Somaya et al. (2008) in terms of accumulating the benefits of ties to previously unconnected external organizations when a valued employee turns over and takes a job at such an organization. Even in the sporting world, the idea of college coaches “letting their athletes go pro” is not always altruistic, as such coaches seek to build their reputations as developers of talent for longer term recruitment purposes (e.g., Katz, 2010).

Finally, although we limited our framework to those transfers sought by subordinates, it would be interesting for future researchers to incorporate situations in which a manager attempts to transfer a subordinate against that subordinates’ wishes (i.e., when the subordinate is not seeking and does not desire the transfer). For example, if an employee of a servant-manager with stronger external than internal social capital does not desire a transfer, the manager may in fact refrain from the situation rather than push the transfer forward, even if he or she believes the transfer would be best for the employee. In this situation, the manager may be concerned that “forcing” the transfer upon the employee may “rock the boat” within a workgroup that already has tenuous levels of trust with the manager.

Conclusion

This paper models likely responses of managers to internal-transfer attempts of their employees. Given the enhanced importance of lateral transfers in organizations, it represents an important step toward understanding how the role of human capital, managerial orientation, and managerial social capital combine to influence these responses. We hope that future theoretical and empirical research will continue to investigate these important issues to ultimately bring greater clarity to a common but understudied organizational phenomenon. We further encourage scholars in broader areas of organizational psychology to use this framework as a platform from which to develop richer theories of organizational member response constellations.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

1. Although some authors regard stewardship as one of the characteristics of servant leadership (e.g., Greenleaf, 1998), we stress that servant leadership tends to focus on employees, not the organization.
2. The following sources have used or developed measures of agent, steward, and servant orientations: Davis et al. (2007); Frankforter, Davis, Vollrath, and Hill (2007); and Liden et al. (2008).
3. For our purposes, we classify ties as informal relations which are generally positive, such as friendship or advice, and do not address the effects of “negative ties” such as those discussed in Labianca and Brass (2006).

4. In the interest of space we do not provide a precise formulation of this social network measure. However, we encourage interested readers to contact the third author for more details on this measure.

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