The authors examined the effects of supervisory guidance (providing instruction to employees) and behavioral integrity (a pattern of word–deed alignment) on employee organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) and deviant behavior. Results revealed a pattern of Supervisory Guidance × Behavioral Integrity interaction effects, such that relationships between guidance and outcome variables were dependent on the level of behavioral integrity exhibited by supervisors. The interactions suggest a positive relationship between supervisory guidance and OCBs when behavioral integrity is high but also a positive relationship between guidance and deviant behavior when behavioral integrity is low. These results were consistent across 2 independent field samples: 1 assessing individual employee perceptions of supervisory behavior and the other assessing aggregate perceptions of supervisory behavior among employees in bank branches.

Keywords: behavioral integrity, supervisory guidance, deviant behavior, citizenship, HLM

A recent series of unprecedented accounting scandals at once-venerated corporations attests to the difficulty associated with promoting prosocial employee behavior and deterring counterproductive employee behavior (Loviscky, Treviño, & Jacobs, 2003). When employees engage in counterproductive behaviors, these behaviors can have devastating effects on the organization (Robinson & Bennett, 1997). For example, the monetary costs of deviant acts such as employee fraud and theft are estimated at over $50 billion annually (Sandberg, 2003). However, when employees engage in prosocial behaviors that exceed their prescribed duties, research has shown that organizations reap tremendous benefits in terms of organizational performance and customer satisfaction (Podsakoff, Ahearne, & MacKenzie, 1997).

As a consequence, researchers and practitioners have been prompted to develop a deeper understanding of the factors associated with an employee’s conduct that either aids the organization through organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs; Organ, 1997) or harms the organization or individuals within the organization through deviant behaviors (Dietz, Robinson, Folger, Baron, & Schulz, 2003; Robinson & Bennett, 1997). OCBs consist of prosocial behaviors that “support the social and psychological environment in which task performance takes place” (Organ, 1997, p. 95), whereas deviance consists of behaviors that violate important organizational norms and result in harm to the organization or its members (Robinson & Bennett, 1997). In particular, we focus on OCBs engaged in without expectation for reward by employees as well as deviant behavior engaged in with the intention of remaining undetected.

Recently, research has begun to expand the breadth of possible factors that might influence the advancement of OCBs or decline of deviance, beyond more traditional predictors such as procedural justice (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2000). These factors have included community context (e.g., Dietz et al., 2003), coworker behavior (Aquino & Douglas, 2003; Bommer, Miles, & Grover, 2003; Glomb & Liao, 2003; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998), or both (LeBlanc & Kelloway, 2002). For example, Dietz et al. (2003) found that community violent crime rates were a stronger predictor of plant-level aggression than procedural justice climate, whereas Aquino and Douglas (2003) found that coworker modeling of aggressive behaviors moderated the relationship between identity threat and antisocial behavior among low-status employees.

Despite all of these promising advances, the literature still lacks evidence of the association between supervisory influence and employee OCBs and deviance (Wimbush, 1999; Wimbush & Shepard, 1994). Therefore, the purpose of this study was to examine two forms of supervisory influence—supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity—and to hypothesize how their main and interactive effects likely relate to employee tendencies to engage in OCBs and deviance. By supervisory guidance, we refer to the
extent to which supervisors instruct their employees regarding the enactment of positive behaviors and avoidance of negative behaviors. The focus of supervisory guidance is on telling employees what to do with regards to right and wrong in the workplace. Thus, it is not concerned with whether supervisors themselves engage in positive or negative behaviors but rather only with the instruction or direction provided by supervisors toward employees in this regard. Because supervisors seek to explicitly influence desired workplace behavior through guidance, it represents a direct means of potentially bringing about greater levels of OCBs and deterring deviant behavior, making it critical to study.

In contrast, behavioral integrity refers to “the perceived pattern of alignment between an actor’s words and deeds” (Simons, 2002, p. 19) and captures the extent to which supervisors are role models of desirable behaviors through their own actions. Thus, behavioral integrity refers to a pattern of supervisory actions that reflect positive workplace behaviors and the avoidance of negative workplace behaviors. Whereas we argue that behavioral integrity is associated with increased levels of OCBs and decreased levels of deviance, we further argue that behavioral integrity likely influences the relationship between supervisory guidance and outcomes such as OCBs and deviance. In particular, it is possible that the positive effects of supervisory guidance (i.e., in terms of increased OCBs and decreased deviance) are only likely to materialize when supervisors also set an example of desirable behavior through their own actions. In fact, failure to exhibit behavioral integrity while attempting to provide behavioral guidance is potentially detrimental in terms of these outcomes.

The importance of investigating these issues is underscored by a recent survey indicating that more than 20% of American workers view senior managers as failing to act in a manner consistent with their words. This survey description concluded that “senior management must ‘walk the talk’ or suffer the consequences of their actions” (Bates, 2002, p. 12). Wimbush and Shepard (1994) similarly claimed that “supervisors provide the model for how subordinates should act” (p. 642). Social learning theory (Bandura, 1977) suggests the means by which a supervisor’s actions might directly translate to employee actions through employee emulation of supervisory behavior. In addition, social information processing theory suggests that norms that encourage or discourage OCBs or deviant behavior likely are transmitted through information available in one’s immediate environment (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Because supervisors are often a salient part of a work environment, they are likely to affect the interpretation of norms by employees.

In the following section, we describe our hypotheses related to the effects of supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity on employee OCBs and deviance. We used data from over 1,100 employees in two separate banking organizations to test these hypotheses.

Relationships Between Supervisory Influence and Employee OCBs and Deviance

Supervisory Guidance

Workplace supervisors are in a unique position to exert influence over their subordinates by virtue of their legitimate authority within the organizational structure (French & Raven, 1959; Hughes, Ginnett, & Curphy, 1993). Moreover, supervisors often have control over valuable resources (e.g., budgets, scheduling, etc.) and other outcomes (e.g., performance appraisals, salary decisions) that are consequential for employees (French & Raven, 1959). Supervisors are charged with creating and managing the expectations, norms, or reward systems that compel employee compliance to achieve these outcomes (Wimbush, 1999). Accordingly, employees are susceptible to the influences exerted on them by their supervisors, and these influences are likely to be evident in their attitudes and behaviors (Hughes et al., 1993; Wimbush, 1999).

By providing guidance to their employees, supervisors instruct those employees regarding appropriate workplace behaviors. Supervisors are often responsible for establishing performance requirements, setting standards for employee conduct, and ensuring that subordinates improve their performance (Treviño & Nelson, 1999). They provide feedback to workers through formal and informal evaluations, salary increases, and job assignments (Wimbush, 1999). Moreover, supervisors are often responsible for promulgating corporate value statements and behavioral norms to their subordinates. Such directives often stress or reinforce how employees should deal with issues of right or wrong, or how employees might expend extra effort on behalf of the organization. Given that the employment relationship is conditional on the employee following the directions of his or her workplace supervisor (and pleasing the supervisor in order to receive positive rewards and evaluations), it is reasonable to hypothesize that supervisory guidance will encourage OCBs and deter deviant behaviors among employees.

Hypothesis 1: Supervisory guidance will be positively associated with a tendency for employees to engage in OCBs.

Hypothesis 2: Supervisory guidance will be negatively associated with a tendency for employees to engage in deviant behavior.

Behavioral Integrity

Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory suggests that employee OCBs and deviance may occur as a result of observing and emulating the behavior of salient role models, and researchers have proposed models of deviant behavior that are based on social influence (e.g., Greenberg, 1997). Studies by Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly (1998) and Bommer et al. (2003) have drawn on social learning theory to show that the deviant behavior and OCBs of individual employees are associated with the degree to which their coworkers also engage in these types of behaviors. That is, employees may look to others within the organization as role models and behave in a similar fashion (O’Leary-Kelly, Griffin, & Glew, 1996; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). A more recent study also used a social learning framework in examining two alternative perspectives on antecedents of workplace violence. Specifically, Dietz et al. (2003) compared the effects of procedural justice climate in organizations with the level of societal violence in the community in which the organization resided. Consistent with social learning, they found that societal violence exhibited a spillover effect in leading to greater within-organization violence, whereas procedural justice climate failed to predict violence. This finding suggests that traditional predictors of deviant behavior...
such as procedural justice may not be sufficient, making research that examines alternative antecedents important.

Following from Bandura’s (1977) work, we contend that supervisors’ actual conduct, in terms of how closely their actions are consistent with their stated principles, is another environmental influence that makes norms regarding appropriate workplace behaviors salient. That is, employees look for cues to reduce uncertainty and enhance predictability in their environments. They strongly rely on inferences drawn from observing their supervisors’ behavior (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Rousseau & Greller, 1994), using supervisors in particular as referents in shaping their own perceptions of norms about and level of appropriate behavior (Lewicki, Poland, Minton, & Sheppard, 1997). Supervisors are posited to be (a) a central source of information regarding employee role expectations (e.g., Wimbush, 1999) and (b) salient role models who establish norms of appropriate and desirable behaviors for their subordinates through their actions (O’Leary-Kelly et al., 1996).

Therefore, we were interested in the extent to which supervisors behave with integrity. Earlier work on integrity tended to view this construct as synonymous with trustworthiness and honesty (Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). This view was later expanded by Becker (1998), who argued for an objectivist approach that views integrity as acting in line with espoused, morally justifiable values. Simons (2002) developed a model of “behavioral integrity,” characterizing this construct as “the extent to which employees believe a manager ‘walks her talk,’ and conversely, reflecting the extent to which they see her as ‘talking her walk’” (p. 19). In this model, behavioral integrity does not consider the morality of the principles being espoused. Moreover, behavioral integrity is conceptualized as a pattern of word-deed alignment, rather than a specific instance. Thus, supervisory behavioral integrity is thought to influence the establishment of norms among employees regarding appropriate workplace behavior, which in turn is related to an increase in employee OCBs and a decrease in deviance.

**Hypothesis 3:** Supervisory behavioral integrity will be positively associated with a tendency for employees to engage in OCBs.

**Hypothesis 4:** Supervisory behavioral integrity will be negatively associated with a tendency for employees to engage in deviant behavior.

Finally, we propose that supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity considered in combination relate most strongly to employee OCBs and deviant behavior. More specifically, in the absence of supervisory behavioral integrity, supervisory guidance may actually have a deleterious effect on outcomes, whereas when behavioral integrity is evident, relationships between supervisory guidance and OCBs should be positive, and relationships between guidance and deviance should be negative. We focus first on these latter relationships.

When supervisors discuss their expectations with subordinates, pointing out areas in which employees may exhibit positive behavior or avoid negative behavior, and the supervisors actually engage in these patterns of behavior themselves (i.e., minimizing the discrepancy between their espoused and enacted values), mutually reinforcing threads of supervisory influence develop that should relate to higher levels of OCBs and lower levels of deviance. In short, combining supervisory guidance of employees with behavioral integrity is likely to yield the most beneficial effects on employee OCBs and deviance by (a) providing a clear set of expectations for employees and by (b) demonstrating desired behaviors through a consistent pattern of word-deed alignment.

However, when a supervisor provides guidance about appropriate workplace behavior but does not exhibit behavioral integrity, research suggests a deleterious effect on employee OCBs and deviance. The theory of psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966) proposes that individuals will engage in behaviors designed to restore a sense of control when it appears that control is threatened in some way. Through guidance, supervisors strive to exert a measure of control over subordinates by encouraging them to act in desired ways or avoid acting in undesirable ways. When a supervisor does not demonstrate behavioral integrity while providing this guidance, restoration of control, or reactance effects, might consist of compensatory actions such as a withholding of OCBs or enactment of deviant behavior by subordinates. On the other hand, when the supervisor’s behavioral integrity is high, this consistency shows that a supervisor is not merely trying to control the actions of subordinates without regard to his or her own personal behavior but rather is sincere in also personally embracing these behavioral norms. This is consistent with advice to managers that cautions against behaviors attempting to provide guidance to others without also exhibiting desired behaviors (e.g., Treviño & Nelson, 1999).

**Hypothesis 5:** There will be a Supervisory Guidance × Behavioral Integrity interaction on OCBs, such that the slope of the relationship between guidance and OCBs will be positive when behavioral integrity is high and negative when behavioral integrity is low.

**Hypothesis 6:** There will be a Supervisory Guidance × Behavioral Integrity interaction on deviance, such that the slope of the relationship between guidance and deviance will be negative when behavioral integrity is high and positive when behavioral integrity is low.

**Method**

We tested the study hypotheses using two separate field samples of retail bank employees from banks based in the midwestern United States. Analyses were conducted on each sample independently instead of combining the samples for two reasons: (a) Each provided organization-specific examples of OCBs and deviant behavior, and (b) whereas the first sample was obtained from a large bank card processing division, the second sample was separable by distinct branch locations and thus was subject to multilevel analyses. This combination of samples allowed us to cross-validate results using two idiosyncratic sets of employee OCBs and deviant behaviors across two levels of analysis, and it had the advantage of strengthening the external validity and generalizability of results.

Specifically, 840 employees responded to a questionnaire from the first bank (herein known as Bank A); the second sample (Bank B) consisted of 274 employees in 28 branches, each of which had at least 4 employees respond. The original population under study was 1,459 across both banks, yielding an overall response rate of more than 75%. Two questionnaires from Bank A and three from Bank B were judged unusable, as respondents...
indicated “neutral” for all OCB and deviance items (35 and 38 items in Banks A and B, respectively). The samples included both full- and part-time employees who worked in a variety of job categories including marketing, customer service, personal banking, administration-planning, clerical, and credit and fraud investigation. Bank officials distributed surveys to employees during working hours. Bank A employees were asked to fill out the survey during break time at a central location near their work station, Bank B employees completed the survey and placed it in a secure envelope mailed to an in-bank lock box. All participants were guaranteed complete anonymity.

**Measures**

**Generation of OCB and deviance items.** Prior to the main study, a critical incidents approach was used to inductively generate items that would appropriately tap OCBs and deviance in the two banks. We chose to gather critical incidents separately from each bank in order to (a) more closely capture OCBs and deviance in the context of these specific settings, (b) allow for cross-validation of findings across two diverse sets of OCB and deviance items in two separate organizations, and (c) ensure that we captured examples of the largest possible number of relevant OCB and deviant behaviors. Deductive approaches that rely on previously generated scales risk missing important elements of behavior that may be idiosyncratic to a given organization, a set of job categories, and so forth. Indeed, in a recent meta-analysis assessing the dimensionality of OCBs, LePine, Erez, and Johnson (2002) suggested that researchers “identify activities that contribute positively and negatively to the organization and then obtain ratings of how likely it is that an employee would engage in those behaviors” (p. 62). Roy J. Lewicki and a research assistant conducted five focus groups of 7–10 employees at each site. This led to the generation of over 150 critical incidents at each site. Judges (subject matter expert doctoral students) categorized these critical incident items and wrote a total of 35 OCB and deviance items for Bank A and 38 for Bank B.

In order to remain consistent with past research examining these types of employee behavior, we partitioned the items into subscales that tapped OCBs directed toward individuals (OCB-I), deviance directed toward individuals (DEV-I), OCBs directed toward the organization (OCB-O), and deviance directed toward the organization (i.e., DEV-O; McNeely & Meglino, 1994; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Specifically, we independently coded all behavioral items (35 from Bank A and 38 from Bank B) into these four categories for each bank. Although the resulting DEV-I and DEV-O scales demonstrated acceptable alpha reliabilities in both samples (.74 and .70 for DEV-I in Banks A and B, respectively; seven- and eight-item scales, respectively; .88 and .80 for DEV-O in Banks A and B, respectively; 20- and 17-item scales, respectively), the OCB scales did not exhibit acceptable alpha levels when considered separately. Thus, similar to Lee and Allen (2002), we collapsed the OCB items into one overall scale (α = .60 and .76 in Banks A and B, respectively; 8- and 13-item scales, respectively). This approach is consistent with the conclusions from the LePine et al. (2002) meta-analysis and has since been adopted by others (e.g., Bonner et al., 2003). Specifically, LePine et al. (2002) suggested treating OCBs as a single latent construct, stating, “Although scholars suggest that OCB is composed of conceptually distinct behavioral dimensions, we have shown that these dimensions have yet to be distinguished from one another in the empirical literature beyond factor analysis” (p. 60).

Example items from the resulting three categories include “pitch in to help others when backlogs occur,” “work ‘off the clock’ to catch up with what I was not able to finish during a regular day,” and “give credit to other employees when those employees are due the credit” (OCB); “take someone else’s personal property,” “participate in gossip about people in Bank Card that I don’t really like,” and “allow another employee to take the blame for my error” (DEV-I); “call in sick when you are not,” “overstate mileage reported on an expense account,” and “use Bank Card telephone for personal long distance calls” (DEV-O). The raters coded 85% of the items identically into these three respective categories. All other items were consistently coded by two out of three of the raters and resolved with the third rater by discussion.

Although not as typical as other-reported measures of these outcomes, self-report measures of deviance (Aquino, Lewis, & Bradfield, 1999; Bacharach, Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl, 2002; Bennett & Robinson, 2000) and OCBs (Bommer et al., 2003; Chattopadhyay, 1999; Kickul, Lester, & Finkl, 2002) do exist in the literature, with Bommer et al. (2003) finding similar results using supervisor- and self-reported OCBs. We also note the growing recognition among scholars that OCBs are implicitly considered part of a formal reward system, often in the form of contextual performance (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Organ, 1997) even though they may not be designated as formal job duties. On the basis of these observations, Bolino (1999) suggested that the demonstration of OCBs might be contaminated by a desire to manage impressions. However, he also suggested that OCBs may derive from an authentic desire to help the organization or its members, and he recommended that studies clearly address the type of OCB being engaged in (e.g., for organizational furthering or impression management reasons). In particular, he noted, “If an individual engaged in citizenship under conditions where he or she believes that a relevant audience will never know those OCBs had been performed, a motive to help the organization reasonably can be inferred” (p. 94). We therefore focused on citizenship behaviors that are unlikely to be detected, to maximize construct validity and better capture the desire to truly help the organization without expectation for reward on the part of the employee.

Participants were thus asked to rate on a 1–5 scale how likely they might be to perform each of the behaviors, if the action were not likely to be discovered.

**Independent variables.** The independent variables in the present study were supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity. Both were originally measured with five items developed in concert with bank representatives; however, initial factor analytic evidence suggested dropping one item from each scale. Scale items and evidence supporting a two-factor measurement model are shown in the Appendix. Coefficient alphas in the two samples (Banks A and B) were .82 and .86, respectively, for supervisory behavioral integrity and .88 and .87, respectively, for supervisory guidance.

We conducted a pilot study using 27 executive MBA students averaging over 20 years of work experience to assess the convergent validity of our behavioral integrity measure with Simons and McLean-Parks’s (2000) behavioral integrity scale. Simons (2002) suggested that behavioral integrity might consist of two subfacets—word–deed alignment and promise keeping—and previously suggested that empirical evidence for two distinct facets is likely in a well-educated sample (Simons & McLean-Parks, 2000). Initial factor analytic evidence revealed that these two subcomponents existed in our data. Because we were more concerned with the word–deed facet of behavioral integrity, rather than the promise-keeping facet, we assessed the convergence of our original behavioral integrity scale with the word–deed subfacet of Simons and McLean-Parks’s scale, finding a .72 correlation between them (p < .01).

**Control variables.** The literature has identified procedural justice as a key antecedent of OCBs (e.g., Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001) and deviance (e.g., Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), and we therefore controlled for its effects in all of our analyses. It was measured with five items developed specifically for this study, which is consistent with Greenberg’s (1990) suggestion that procedural justice be measured specific to the organization or context under study. An example item is “Our manager and his/her supervisors make a reasonable effort to incorporate the viewpoints of the audience will never know those OCBs had been performed, a motive to help the organization reasonably can be inferred” (p. 94). We therefore focused on citizenship behaviors that are unlikely to be detected, to maximize construct validity and better capture the desire to truly help the organization without expectation for reward on the part of the employee.

We assessed this scale’s convergent validity with a more established procedural justice scale (Colquitt, 2001). Specifically, 25 MBA students averaging 4 years of work experience provided ratings of procedural justice using Colquitt’s (2001) scale and the scale developed for the current study. The correlation between these scales was .77 (p < .01), providing evidence of convergent validity and justification for our use of the current scale. We also controlled
for employment status (full or part time) and employment category (e.g., marketing, personal banking) in all analyses, as some evidence has suggested links between variables such as these and our outcomes (e.g., Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2002).

Results

As mentioned, a key difference between banks was that Bank A employees were all from a centralized division, whereas Bank B employees were separable by branch location. Accordingly, we used moderated regression to analyze the Bank A data at the individual level and hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) in Bank B to examine the effects of branch-level supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity on individual employee citizenship and deviant behavior. The means, standard deviations, and correlations for all study variables in Banks A and B are presented in Table 1. We excluded 1 participant’s DEV-I score from analyses involving DEV-I in Bank A and 1 participant’s OCB score and another participant’s DEV-I and DEV-O scores from respective analyses in the Bank B sample. These cases were four standard deviations from their corresponding means and identified as extreme outliers using the SPSS (Version 12) box plot procedure. Prior to testing hypotheses, we centered predictors on their respective means as suggested by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003) when investigating interactions.

Bank A Results

As shown in Table 2, Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported in Bank A, whereas Hypothesis 3 was supported, and Hypothesis 4 was partially supported. Specifically, the beta coefficient for supervisory guidance failed to reach significance in the second step of any of the three analyses. Thus, the main effects of supervisory guidance were not associated with intended OCBs, DEV-I, or DEV-O. Hypotheses 3 and 4 predicted that supervisory behavioral integrity would be associated with the outcome variables. As shown in Table 2 (second step of the regression analyses), greater levels of behavioral integrity were associated with increased intentions to engage in OCBs (β = 0.09, p < .05) and decreased DEV-O (β = −0.09, p < .05). However, behavioral integrity did not relate to DEV-I in Bank A (β = −0.07, ns).

Hypothesis 5 predicted interactive effects of supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity on OCBs, such that the slope of the relationship between supervisory guidance and OCBs would be positive when behavioral integrity was high and negative when behavioral integrity was low. This hypothesis was partially supported in Bank A, and results are presented in Table 2. As illustrated in Figure 1A, simple slope analyses revealed that when behavioral integrity was low, supervisory guidance did not significantly relate to employee OCBs, t(788) = −1.40, ns. In contrast, when behavioral integrity was high, supervisory guidance was positively related to OCBs, t(788) = 2.32, p < .05. This suggests that supervisory guidance is only positively related to OCBs when a concomitant high level of behavioral integrity is exhibited by supervisors.

Hypothesis 6 predicted that the interaction of supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity would be associated with deviant behavior, such that the slope of the relationship between guidance

Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Study Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>8</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1. Procedural justice</td>
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<td>Bank A</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.25*</td>
<td>0.38**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>−0.18*</td>
<td>−0.14*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank B</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>0.71</td>
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<td>2. Employment status (1 = full time)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank A</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.36**</td>
<td>−0.04</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<td>Bank B</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.47</td>
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<td>3. Job category</td>
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<td>Bank A</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 = customer service</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.09**</td>
<td>−0.21**</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 = marketing</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 = risk–fraud</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank B (1 = personal banker)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
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<td>4. Supervisory guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank A</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
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<td>−0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank B</td>
<td>3.66*</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
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<td>5. Supervisory behavioral integrity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank A</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>0.98</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.44**</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>0.51**</td>
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<td>Bank B</td>
<td>3.44*</td>
<td>0.50*</td>
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<td>6. Organizational citizenship behaviors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank A</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.18**</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank B</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. DEV-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank A</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank B</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. DEV-O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank A</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.18**</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>−0.09*</td>
<td>−0.11**</td>
<td>−0.16**</td>
<td>−0.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank B</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Ns = 838 (Bank A) and 264 (Bank B). Bank A correlations appear below the diagonal; Bank B correlations appear above the diagonal. *N = 27 branches for statistics indicated. *p < .05. **p < .01.
and deviant behavior would be negative when behavioral integrity was high and positive when behavioral integrity was low. Looking first at DEV-I as a dependent variable, this interaction was significant in Bank A (see Table 2). The form of the effect (see Figure 1B) was such that there was a positive slope along the line representing low behavioral integrity, $t(787) = 2.12, p < .05$, as well as a negative slope along the high behavioral integrity line, $t(787) = -2.39, p < .05$. Thus, higher levels of supervisory guidance only related to lower levels of DEV-I when a high level of behavioral integrity was present. In contrast, when behavioral

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step and variable</th>
<th>OCBs $\beta$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta R^2$</th>
<th>DEV-I $\beta$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta R^2$</th>
<th>DEV-O $\beta$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta R^2$</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1. Procedural justice</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>.02*</td>
<td>.02*</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td>.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status</td>
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<td>.02</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Job category</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Supervisory guidance</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td>.01*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.02*</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisory behavioral integrity</td>
<td>.09*</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Supervisory Guidance $\times$ Behavioral Integrity</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td>.01*</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td>.01**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. $Ns = 838$ for OCB and DEV-O analyses and 837 for DEV-I analysis. Dashes indicate that beta weights for individual job category dummy variables were nonsignificant. OCBs = organizational citizenship behaviors; DEV-I = deviance directed toward individuals; DEV-O = deviance directed toward the organization. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Figure 1. A: Bank A interaction of Supervisory Guidance $\times$ Behavioral Integrity on organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs). B: Bank A interaction of Supervisory Guidance $\times$ Behavioral Integrity on deviance directed toward individuals (DEV-I).
integrity was low, supervisory guidance was positively related to DEV-I, suggesting that higher levels of guidance can actually bring about higher levels of DEV-I. Finally, the interaction of supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity did not explain additional variance in DEV-O in Bank A beyond the effects of behavioral integrity found in testing Hypothesis 4. Thus, Hypothesis 6 was partially supported.

Bank B Results

To test the study hypotheses in Bank B, we used HLM, given that employees were nested within bank branches. Specifically, we tested whether aggregate perceptions of supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity would relate to individual-level OCBs, DEV-I, and DEV-O. Because of the noted difficulties associated with detecting interaction effects in field settings (McClelland & Judd, 1993) as well as the fact that the overall Bank B sample was more than 67% smaller than the Bank A sample and consisted of only 28 branches, we adopted a .10 significance level for these analyses.

First, it was necessary to demonstrate sufficient justification for aggregating supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity variables to the branch level of analysis. From a conceptual perspective, Bliese, Halverson, and Schriesheim (2002) claimed that “the study of leadership is inherently multilevel in nature” (p. 4). Indeed it is reasonable that a common perception might exist among employees in a given environment regarding the level of guidance and behavioral integrity exhibited by a supervisor or supervisors in that environment, and Schneider and Reichers’s (1983) symbolic interactionism perspective suggests that distinct patterns of interaction among employees will likely generate these common perceptions. Within a banking organization, it is likely that patterns of interaction exhibit the most distinction among separate branches, and there is precedent in the literature for this distinction among bank branches (e.g., Schneider, White, & Paul, 1998). In addition, the literature on leadership climate suggests that supervisors in a particular unit are likely to have a similar influence on the perceptions of employees in that unit, such that supervisory behavior is likely to be viewed more similarly within units than between units (Ehrhart, 2004; Gavin & Hofmann, 2002; Griffin & Mathieu, 1997), even if those units have multiple supervisors (e.g., Chen & Bliese, 2002). For example, Gavin and Hofmann (2002) argued that “individual members of a given [unit], who have common leaders, are exposed to a similar leadership environment in terms of the behaviors and actions of the leaders” (p. 21). Finally, in his description of behavioral integrity, Simons (2002) suggested that perceptions of behavioral integrity might be meaningfully aggregated to estimate the effect of a manager’s conduct, and he also claimed that behavioral integrity is applicable to referents at various levels of abstraction, including a generalized notion of the management of a given unit.

To empirically justify aggregation, we first computed James, Demaree, and Wolf’s (1984) $r_{wg}$ to examine within-group agreement. The initial median $r_{wg}$ for behavioral integrity across the 28 branches was .69, with a mean of .51. However, upon eliminating one branch that had an $r_{wg}$ level more than four standard deviations lower than the mean and three standard deviations lower than the next lowest branch in terms of $r_{wg}$, these figures improved to .71 ($M = .62$). The median $r_{wg}$ for supervisory guidance was .85 ($M = .80$). Next, one-way analyses of variance were significant for both guidance, $F(26, 237) = 1.45$, $p < .08$, and behavioral integrity, $F(26, 237) = 2.66$, $p < .01$. Corresponding intraclass correlation coefficients—ICC1 and ICC2—were .04 and .31 for guidance, respectively, and .15 and .62 for behavioral integrity, respectively.Eta squared values were .14 and .23 for guidance and behavioral integrity, respectively, with values of .04 and .14, respectively, when corrected for the average branch size (9.78) using Bliese and Halverson’s (1998) formula. The ICC values for supervisory guidance were relatively low, with ICC1 serving as an indication of the level of between-branches variance relative to within-branch variance. ICC2 is an indication of the reliability of the branch means, with lower values making it more difficult to detect emergent relationships using these means (Chen & Bliese, 2002). Despite these lower values, we viewed the balance of empirical evidence and our conceptual rationale as supportive of aggregation, and we proceeded with our HLM approach.

To test our hypotheses, we conducted a means-as-outcomes multilevel analysis (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), which allowed us to model both individual- and branch-level variance in individual OCBs and deviance. We thus estimated the means of OCBs and deviance by branch in our Level 1 analysis and subsequently used the Level 1 intercept as the dependent variable in the Level 2, or between-branches, analysis. More specifically, we modeled branch-level effects of supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity (Hypotheses 1–4) and their interaction (Hypotheses 5–6) on individual-level OCBs and deviant behavior while controlling for individual-level procedural justice perceptions, employment status (full or part time), and job category. This had the advantage of allowing for the examination of supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity at the branch level of analysis without also having to aggregate individual OCBs and deviance to the branch level.

The Level 1 equation consisted of a null model with the three individual-level covariates (control variables) whereby we sought to model the branch-level OCB and deviance means. The Level 1 analysis thus allowed us to determine whether enough between-branches variance existed in these dependent variables to allow for Level 2 analyses, given that a branch-level independent variable can only explain differences between branches on an outcome variable (Hofmann, 1997). On the basis of Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), the Level 1 model for our analyses was as follows:

$$Y_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1(j \text{ job category}) + \beta_2(j \text{ employment status}) + \beta_3(j \text{ procedural justice}) + r_{ij},$$

where $Y_j$ is the observed value of outcome $Y$ for observation $i$ nested within bank branch $j$, $\beta_0$ is the intercept for bank branch $j$, $\beta_1-\beta_3$ are regression slopes of the outcome on the three respective individual-level covariates within group $j$, and $r_{ij}$ is the employee- and branch-specific residual. The intercept represents the model implied mean of $Y$ within branch $j$ after accounting for the effects of the Level 1 covariates.

Results of the three Level 1 analyses demonstrated significant between-branches variance in OCBs ($\tau_{\alpha} = .01, p < .05$), DEV-I ($\tau_{\alpha} = .01, p < .05$), and DEV-O ($\tau_{\alpha} = .02, p < .01$). These analyses also allowed for the computation of an ICC value representing the proportion of between-branches variance relative to total variance exhibited by a variable (Hofmann, Griffin, & Gavin, 2000). In the present study, this represented the proportion of
variance in the dependent variables that existed between branches. ICCs were .06 for OCBs, .05 for DEV-I, and .10 for DEV-O. Thus, for example, 6% of the total variance in OCBs existed between branches. These results justified Level 2 analyses, in which branch-level predictors were introduced in order to account for the mean differences in the dependent variables that existed between branches.

Hypotheses 1–4 predicted main effects of supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity on the outcome variables. A means-as-outcomes model was tested whereby the two branch-level main effects terms were included in a Level 2 model, as follows:

$$
\beta_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{(behavioral integrity)}
+ \gamma_{02} \text{(supervisory guidance)} + u_{ij}.
$$

Here, $\gamma_{00}$ is the fixed intercept, $\gamma_{01}$ and $\gamma_{02}$ are the fixed regression coefficients for the two respective main effects, and $u_{ij}$ is the Level 2 residual. Results indicated that neither variable was related to OCBs or DEV-O; however, branch-level behavioral integrity was negatively related to individual-level DEV-I ($\gamma_{01} = -.13$, $t(24) = -2.02$, $p < .06$). Thus, Hypotheses 1–3 were not supported, whereas Hypothesis 4 was partially supported in Bank B.

Hypotheses 5 and 6 predicted interactive effects of supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity on the outcome variables. Accordingly, the Level 2 model for these analyses was as follows:

$$
\beta_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{(behavioral integrity)} + \gamma_{02} \text{(supervisory guidance)}
+ \gamma_{03} \text{(Integrity × Guidance)} + u_{ij}.
$$

Results were supportive of these hypotheses. Specifically, as shown in Table 3, the interaction of branch-level supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity was associated with individual-level OCBs ($\gamma_{03} = .36$, $t(23) = 2.50$, $p < .05$; DEV-I ($\gamma_{03} = -.32$, $t(23) = -2.00$, $p < .06$; and DEV-O ($\gamma_{03} = -.33$, $t(23) = -1.95$, $p < .07$. Figure 2 illustrates the nature of these interactions, and a comparison with Bank A interactions (see Figure 1) suggests a high degree of consistency across samples and levels of analysis. On the basis of the study by Preacher, Curran, and Bauer (in press), simple slope analyses revealed that, for OCBs, the relationship between branch-level supervisory guidance and individual-level OCBs was positive when branch-level behavioral integrity was high ($z = 2.27$, $p < .05$) but negative when branch-level behavioral integrity was low ($z = -1.86$, $p < .07$). For both DEV-I and, in this bank, DEV-O, the relationship between supervisory guidance and the respective deviance foci was positive when behavioral integrity was low ($z = 2.21$ and $z = 2.31$ for DEV-I and DEV-O, respectively, both $p < .05$) but nonsignificant when behavioral integrity was high. This indicates that supervisory guidance increases the prevalence of OCBs but only when accompanied by a high level of behavioral integrity. In contrast, higher levels of supervisory guidance combined with a low level of behavioral integrity can actually have deleterious effects in terms of lower levels of OCBs and higher levels of DEV-I and DEV-O.

The amount of between-branches variance explained by supervisory guidance, behavioral integrity, and their interaction can be assessed by computing a ratio that compares the residual variance component, $u_{ij}$, for the outcome variables in a model without the focal predictors with the $u_{ij}$ term from a model in which these predictors are included (Hofmann et al., 2000). For example, to assess the between-branches variance explained by branch-level supervisory guidance, behavioral integrity, and their interaction, we compared the $u_{ij}$ term resulting from a null model that does not include these predictors with the $u_{ij}$ term from a model that includes them. This reduction in variance calculation indicated that the two main effects and their interaction explained 43% of the between-branches variance in OCBs. Because 6% of the total variance in OCBs existed between branches (on the basis of the earlier ICC calculation), these results indicated that the three predictors explained 3% of the total variance in OCBs ($0.06 \times 0.03$). For DEV-I, the three predictors explained 45% of the between-branches variance, meaning that these predictors also explained 2% of the total variance ($0.05 \times 0.03$). For DEV-O, the predictors explained 28% of the between-branches variance, meaning they explained 3% of the total variance.

In addition to these analyses, it is possible to assess the unique variance explained by the interaction terms by comparing the $u_{ij}$ term from a model including only the two main effects with the $u_{ij}$ term from a model in which the interaction term is also included. The additional reduction in variance calculations showed that the interaction of branch-level supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity uniquely explained 20%, 25%, and 19% of the between-branches variance in OCBs, DEV-I, and DEV-O, respectively, after accounting for the main effects. This, combined with the ICC values reported earlier, indicates that these interactions explained 1% (OCBs and DEV-I) and 2% (DEV-O) of the total variance in the respective outcome variables.

Table 3
Hierarchical Linear Modeling Level 2 Results for Interaction Analyses—Bank B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>OCBs</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>DEV-I</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>DEV-O</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept, $\gamma_{00}$</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>92.87**</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>40.69**</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>34.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral integrity, $\gamma_{01}$</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-2.14*</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisory guidance, $\gamma_{02}$</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisory Guidance × Behavioral Integrity, $\gamma_{03}$</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>2.50*</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-2.00†</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-1.95†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. $N = 263$ individuals nested within 27 bank branches for each analysis. OCBs = organizational citizenship behaviors; DEV-I = deviance directed toward individuals; DEV-O = deviance directed toward the organization; $\gamma_{00}$ = fixed intercept; $\gamma_{01}$–$\gamma_{03}$ = fixed regression coefficients.

† $p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. 

On the basis of past research as well as our current results, we conducted an additional set of exploratory analyses. Specifically, given the consistent role played by procedural justice in predicting OCBs and deviance in past research as well as its association with all three outcome variables in Bank A (see Table 2, Step 1) and DEV-I ($\gamma_{10} = -.11, p < .05$) and DEV-O ($\gamma_{10} = -.09, p < .05$) in Bank B, we examined the interaction of procedural justice and behavioral integrity on the outcome variables. It is likely that when supervisors enact fair procedures in the workplace and also exhibit patterns of word–deed alignment, higher levels of OCBs and lower

Supplemental Analyses

On the basis of past research as well as our current results, we conducted an additional set of exploratory analyses. Specifically, given the consistent role played by procedural justice in predicting OCBs and deviance in past research as well as its association with...
levels of deviance will result. This follows first from social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), such that when procedures are thought to be fair (unfair) the justice literature suggests that an employee is likely to feel a desire to exhibit OCBs (deviant behavior). By exhibiting behavioral integrity in addition to enacting fair procedures, supervisors model desired behavior, allowing employees to respond appropriately by emulating such behavior. That is, a pattern of supervisory word–deed alignment might act as a roadmap to employees for the enactment of OCBs and/or avoidance of deviant behavior in response to fair procedures.

Results of this supplemental analysis in Bank A indicated that the Procedural Justice × Behavioral Integrity interaction was significantly associated with OCBs ($\beta = .12, \Delta R^2 = .01, p < .01$) but not with DEV-I or DEV-O. The form of the OCB interaction effect was consistent with previous results, suggesting that when behavioral integrity was high, procedural justice was positively related to OCBs, $r(788) = 4.82, p < .01$, whereas when behavioral integrity was low, procedural justice did not relate to OCBs, $r(788) = -0.92, ns$. This indicates that the positive effects of procedural justice on OCBs only materialize when behavioral integrity is high. In Bank B, a cross-level analysis using HLM (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) failed to reveal interactions of procedural justice and behavioral integrity on OCBs or DEV-I but did reveal a significant interaction on DEV-O ($r(11) = -1.16, p < .05$). The form of this interaction was also consistent with previous results in that the relationship between procedural justice and DEV-O was nonsignificant when behavioral integrity was low but significantly negative when behavioral integrity was high ($z = 3.46, p < .01$). It therefore appears that procedural justice is negatively related to DEV-O only when branch-level perceptions of behavioral integrity are high.

**Discussion**

This study contributes to the literature on employee OCBs and deviancy by introducing two means by which supervisors might generate greater levels of OCBs and decreased levels of deviant behavior among subordinates—supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity. A pattern of findings materialized, such that supervisory guidance considered in isolation tended not to be related to the outcome variables. However, of particular interest, relationships between guidance and the outcomes varied as a function of the degree to which supervisors were perceived to exhibit behavioral integrity. This pattern was consistent across two independent samples—examining individual perceptions of supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity and the other examining these perceptions at the bank branch level of analysis. Specifically, for two of the outcome variables (OCBs and DEV-I) in Bank A and all three outcome variables in Bank B, supervisory guidance interacted with behavioral integrity. First, the relationship between guidance and OCBs was positive in both banks when behavioral integrity was high. In contrast, when behavioral integrity was low, a reversal of the seemingly positive effects of providing guidance occurred in both banks, to the extent that a lack of behavioral integrity in the wake of a higher degree of guidance actually increased the tendency to exhibit deviance directed toward individuals in Bank A and both forms of deviance in Bank B. Similarly notable was the emergence of a positive relationship between guidance and DEV-I in Bank A as well as a negative relationship between guidance and OCBs in Bank B when behavioral integrity was low.

More specifically, Figures 1 and 2 as well as simple slope analyses suggest that behavioral integrity was even more crucial when supervisors provided guidance to employees. That is, as guidance increased in these samples, there tended to be a greater effect on OCBs and DEV-I, depending on the corresponding level of behavioral integrity. For example, as guidance increased and there was a corresponding low level of behavioral integrity by supervisors, some of the outcomes were relatively less favorable, compared with a situation in which supervisors provided less guidance or behavioral integrity. This suggests that if one provides guidance, it is essential that one exhibits behavioral integrity as well. On the other hand, when supervisory guidance was lower, behavioral integrity did not appear to matter to any considerable extent. Taken together, this pattern of interactions is consistent with social learning theory (Bandura, 1977), Simons’s (2002) behavioral integrity work, and Brehm’s (1966) theory of psychological reactance. These perspectives address the need for those in authority to model espoused standards of behavior while not appearing to merely control or guide the actions of others through words with no corresponding deeds.

Exploratory analyses examining interactions of behavioral integrity and procedural justice provide further evidence for the critical role of behavioral integrity in these banks. Although the pattern of findings was less clear across samples compared with the Supervisory Guidance × Behavioral Integrity interactions, we found that procedural justice only related to OCBs in Bank A and DEV-O in Bank B when a concomitant high level of behavioral integrity was exhibited by supervisors. This extends the justice literature and should encourage future research to consider the role of supervisors in providing a behavioral example to employees who wish to “repay” the organization for fair procedures (in the form of OCBs) or unfair procedures (in the form of deviance). For example, employees may wish to react to fair procedures by engaging in citizenship, but, without a salient role model demonstrating what constitutes OCBs, they may lack a roadmap to do so.

The present findings are important for several reasons. First, although researchers have consistently found that the enactment of fair procedures in the workplace can lead to decreased levels of deviant behavior and increased levels of OCBs (e.g., Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001), this study contributes to the growing literature that examines factors other than procedural justice enacted within the workplace as predictors of workplace deviance and OCBs (e.g., community context and co-worker behavior; Dietz et al., 2003; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). Second, by specifically assessing OCBs as those behaviors likely to be performed if not likely to be discovered, the study isolates that aspect of OCBs that is essentially free of the potentially contaminating presence of impression management tactics (Bolino, 1999), instead focusing on citizenship behavior representative of an authentic desire to help the organization without expectation of reward.

Third, the results provide further support for the power of social learning in the workplace. Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly (1998)
used a social learning framework to show that coworkers might influence the deviant behavior of employees, whereas Dietz et al. (2003) showed that community violence might spill over into the workplace and predict violence beyond procedural justice climate. This study complements earlier work by showing that similar outcomes may be obtained when supervisors exhibit behavioral integrity but also extends this work by examining the interactive effects of supervisory guidance combined with behavioral integrity.

A fourth important contribution of this study is that it was conducted in two separate field settings and made use of two separately generated sets of deviance and OCB items. Although global deviance and OCB scales have been developed and validated (e.g., Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1996), we view our inductive approach as a strength in that it allowed for an assessment of employee OCBs and deviance that is meaningful to particular organizations (LePine et al., 2002). In addition, supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity were assessed as individual employee perceptions in one sample and employee perceptions aggregated by bank branch in the second sample. Overall, whereas we found interactions to be related to two out of three of the outcome variables at the individual level in Bank A, the branch-level perceptions of supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity assessed in Bank B interacted in relating to all three outcome variables. This suggests superior predictive ability at the higher level of analysis and provides direction to future researchers who seek to model similar effects at appropriate levels of analysis.

A notable strength of this study was the replication of findings involving OCBs and DEV-I across the two banks. This pattern of findings is noteworthy given that (a) there is a well-recognized difficulty in detecting moderating effects in field settings (McClelland & Judd, 1993); (b) the results still cross-validated in Bank B, despite operationalizing supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity at the branch level of analysis; (c) employees in each bank worked in very different settings (a large bank credit card division housed in one location vs. multiple small branches spread out over three counties); and (d) for each bank, the dependent variable measures consisted of an idiosyncratic set of OCBs and deviant behaviors. Thus, it appears that the present findings are generalizable from the standpoint of influencing particular groups of OCBs and deviance that are idiosyncratically important to work groups in different organizations doing different jobs in diverse physical locations.

**Limitations**

Although this study has several important strengths, it also contains certain limitations. First, the study used a single questionnaire design and relied on self-report data. This raises the possibility of common method variance (CMV) bias in the Bank A sample and disallows conclusions of causality, although the CMV concern was less in the Bank B sample given that results were obtained using multilevel analyses. In the Bank A sample, although the detected interaction effects and nonsignificant main effects involving supervisory guidance tend to mitigate CMV concerns, we sought to further allay these concerns by following procedures recently developed by Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003) to assess the extent of bias in our samples.

Specifically, these scholars suggested a structural equation modeling approach to assessing CMV bias in which relationships between independent and dependent constructs of interest are assessed with and without the addition of a CMV latent variable. We ran these comparison analyses for the behavioral integrity–OCB and behavioral integrity–DEV-O relationships because these relationships were significant in Bank A (and thus subject to CMV scrutiny). The average drop in correlation coefficient magnitudes was only .06. This, in addition to the significant interaction findings in Bank A and multilevel findings in Bank B, largely mitigates CMV concerns in this study.

Another limitation is that we did not include an assessment of interactional justice in our study. This omission was primarily in the interest of parsimony in developing the survey instrument in concert with bank representatives. However, we acknowledge that this represents a potential missing-variable problem, in that interactional justice has been linked to deviant behavior in prior research (e.g., Aquino et al., 1999). Finally, scales used in the study were not previously established scales but were instead developed in concert with bank representatives in a manner that allowed for customization to the banking environment. However, although we cannot rely on previous research to demonstrate the construct validity of our scales, we have attempted to provide convergent validity and factor analytic evidence to support their use.

**Implications and Future Research**

There are several implications that can be drawn from this study and its findings. Most important, the study has shown that the combination of “walking the talk” through the demonstration of behavioral integrity and providing guidance to employees as to the enactment of positive behaviors and the avoidance of negative behaviors in the workplace can have a significantly positive impact on employee OCBs and deviance. In contrast, simply providing guidance was not demonstrably effective, and the provision of higher levels of guidance without concomitant behavioral integrity on the part of the supervisor can actually be detrimental to OCB and deviant behavior outcomes. In the wake of numerous corporate scandals early in the 21st century, a number of management trade books have advocated both instructing executives on proper behavior as well as setting a strong example for those behaviors (e.g., Badaracco, 2002; Tichy & McGill, 2003). This study provides the first significant evidence of the actual consequences of instruction versus self-demonstration of these behaviors and—at least in this context—shows a clear advantage to providing a behavioral framework to employees through supervisory guidance as well as walking the talk in enhancing positive organizational behaviors.

In addition, although there is ample work to be done to enhance the precision with which researchers study how supervisors encourage subordinate OCBs or mitigate deviant behaviors, there is also a need to study the role of other moderator variables in enhancing OCBs and deterring deviance. For example, Simons’s (2002) model of behavioral integrity suggests that variables such as the degree of employee caring about a focal issue, or the way that supervisors offer social accounts about both productive and destructive organizational behaviors, might have an impact on enhancing OCBs. In addition, with the growing number of variables used to predict OCBs and deviant behavior, future research should build on recent work that has begun to develop more
complex models that integrate and test multiple predictors within studies (e.g., Colbert, Mount, Harter, Witt, & Barrick, 2004). Exploring predictors simultaneously will allow researchers to create a richer understanding of how to encourage OCBs and discourage deviant behavior.

References


In R. Lewicki, R. Bies, & B. Sheppard (Eds.), Research on negotiation in organizations (Vol. 6, pp. 53–86). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.


Appendix

Supervisory Guidance and Behavioral Integrity Scale Items and Exploratory Factor Analysis Results With Bank A Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale item</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supervisory guidance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. My supervisor initiates training and offers advice about what is appropriate to do in our department.</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>−0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. My supervisor coaches me on how to do “the right thing” on the job.</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. My supervisor initiates training and advises me about how to avoid doing the wrong thing.</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. My supervisor coaches me about how to avoid doing “the wrong thing” on the job.</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>−0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavioral integrity (all reverse-scored)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. I wish my supervisor would practice what he or she preaches more often.</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>−0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. My supervisor tells us to follow the rules but doesn’t follow them himself or herself.</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>−0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. My supervisor asks me to do things he or she wouldn’t do himself or herself.</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>−0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. My supervisor can get away with doing things I can’t.</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>−0.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Scales were originally five items each; however, initial exploratory factor analysis of Bank A data yielded factor loadings of less than .50 for one supervisory guidance and one behavioral integrity item. Thus, values represent factor loadings from exploratory factor analysis on Bank A data with four-item scales. Results of this analysis, using a maximum-likelihood approach with oblique rotation, were a good fit with the data (two eigenvalues greater than 1; root-mean-square error of approximation [RMSEA] < .03). This analysis was followed by a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the Bank B data using AMOS statistical software in which we compared the fit of the two-factor model with that of a one-factor model. We expected moderate correlations between supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity and thus allowed these variables to be correlated in CFA analyses. Results cross-validated the two-factor solution from Bank A, with good fit indices (comparison fit index = .98, Tucker–Lewis index = .97, RMSEA < .07) and was a better fit than a one-factor solution. All scales were measured on a 5-point Likert scale with anchors of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Boldface indicates respective factor loadings for supervisory guidance (Factor 1) and behavioral integrity (Factor 2).