

# Colin D. Sullivan

Krannert School of Management • Purdue University  
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## Academic Employment

**Purdue University Krannert School of Management**  
*Assistant Professor of Economics*

**West Lafayette, IN**  
*August 2021 – Present*

**Stanford University Department of Economics**  
*Postdoctoral Fellow*

**Stanford, CA**  
*August 2019 – August 2021*

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## Education

**The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania**  
*PhD, Applied Economics*

**Philadelphia, PA**  
*May 2019*

Thesis Committee: Judd B. Kessler (Chair), Clayton R. Featherstone, Corinne Low

**Harvard University**  
*AM, Statistics*

**Cambridge, MA**  
*May 2014*

**University of Chicago**  
*AB, Economics & Political Science*

**Chicago, IL**  
*June 2009*

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## Research Interests

Matching markets and market design; organ transplantation; labor economics; experiments

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## Publications & Working Papers

Kessler, Judd B., Corinne Low, and Colin D. Sullivan. 2019. **“Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception.”** *American Economic Review*, 109 (11): 3713-44.

*Abstract:* We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called Incentivized Resume Rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.

### **Eliciting Preferences over Life and Death: Experimental Evidence from Organ Transplantation**

*Abstract:* Optimal allocation of scarce, life-saving medical treatment depends on society’s preferences over survival distributions, governed by notions of equality and efficiency. In a novel experiment, I elicit preferences over survival distributions in incentivized, life-or-death decisions. Subjects allocate an organ transplant among real cats with kidney failure. In each choice, subjects allocate a single organ based on the expected survival of each patient. The survival rates imply a price ratio, allowing me to infer the shape of indifference curves over survival bundles. I find that the vast majority (80%) of subjects respond to increases in total expected survival time, while a small minority display Leontief preferences, providing the transplant to the shortest-lived patient at all price ratios. Hypothetical decisions may not be reliable in this context: a large share (46%) of subjects allocate a hypothetical transplant differently than a real transplant, though estimates of aggregate preferences are the same across incentivized and unincentivized conditions. Finally, I show that aversion to wealth inequality is a good predictor of aversion to survival inequality.

**Learning to Manipulate: Experimental Evidence on Out-of-Equilibrium Truth-Telling (with Clayton R. Featherstone and Eric Mayefsky)**

*Abstract:* When matching mechanisms yield unstable assignments, unraveling can lead participants to abandon them. This is thought to explain why, empirically, the stable Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism persists where unstable alternatives, such as priority mechanisms, do not. Theory, however, tells us that both DA and priority mechanisms can yield unstable matches in incomplete information equilibrium. Nonetheless, if match participants on the proposed-to side deviate from equilibrium by truth-telling, then DA yields stable outcomes. In an experiment, we find such behavior under DA (but not under a priority mechanism). This suggests that out-of-equilibrium truth-telling might help to explain the success of DA. We model the learning process under both mechanisms, and find that initial beliefs about gameplay drive differences in learning. These findings suggest the benefits of a persistent clearinghouse under DA could be undone by informing players of the game's strategic elements.

**Other-Regarding Preferences and Paternalistic Discrimination in Hiring (with Nina Buchmann and Carl Meyer)**

*Abstract:* Women in Bangladesh struggle to access the labor market in general and male-dominated occupations in particular, despite recent progress in education and training. We use a two-sided field experiment to identify a novel form of labor market discrimination, "paternalistic discrimination," the preferential hiring of male workers to protect female workers from jobs perceived as harmful or difficult. We observe real application and hiring decisions for a night-shift job in Bangladesh and experimentally vary employers' and candidates' perceptions of the danger of the job. Improvements to worker safety increase both the supply of and demand for female labor, leading to a compounding increase in female workers. In a behavioral labor model, we demonstrate how other-regarding preferences affect hiring and wages in equilibrium, and we complement the experimental results with survey data to i) analyze the effect of paternalistic discrimination on horizontal and vertical gender segregation in different industries, ii) estimate the degree to which paternalistic preferences restrict women's labor potential and work readiness, and iii) identify policies that can increase women's employment across different industries in Bangladesh.

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**Teaching**

<b>Undergraduate Experimental Economics</b> <i>Purdue University</i>	<b>West Lafayette, IN</b> <i>Fall 2021, Fall 2022</i>
<b>Graduate Experimental Economics</b> <i>Purdue University</i>	<b>West Lafayette, IN</b> <i>Spring 2022, Fall 2022</i>
<b>Economic Principles for Social Policy (MSSP 668 Module I)</b> <i>University of Pennsylvania School of Social Policy and Practice</i>	<b>Philadelphia, PA</b> <i>Fall 2016</i>

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**Professional Activities**

*Conference Presentations*

<b>SITE Experimental Economics</b> <i>Palo Alto, CA</i>	<b>August 2017</b>
<b>Advances with Field Experiments</b> <i>Chicago, IL</i>	<b>September 2017</b>
<b>Wharton, Columbia &amp; NYU Experimental Economics Student Conference</b> <i>New York, NY</i>	<b>October 2016, 2017, &amp; 2018</b>

*Institutional Service*

<b>Penn Graduate and Professional Students Assembly</b> <i>Wharton Doctoral Representative</i>	<b>2016 – 2017</b>
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## Grants & Fellowships

Russell Ackoff Doctoral Student Fellowship	Spring 2018
Wharton Business Economics and Public Policy Travel Grant	Fall 2017
GAPSA Research Travel Grant	Summer 2017
George James Term Fund Travel Award	Summer 2017
Wharton Graduate Research Fellowship	2015 – 2019
Wharton Graduate Educational Fellowship	2014 – 2015
National Security Education Program Boren Scholarship, Damascus (Syria)	June – December 2007
University of Chicago Foreign Language Acquisition Grant, Damascus (Syria)	Summer 2007

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## Other Experience

<b>Center for Education Policy Research, Harvard University</b> <i>Research Analyst</i>	<b>Cambridge, MA</b> <i>September 2012 – June 2014</i>
<b>Central Intelligence Agency</b> <i>Economic Analyst — Middle East and North Africa</i>	<b>McLean, VA</b> <i>July 2011 – August 2012</i>
<b>Harvard Kennedy School</b> <i>Research Assistant to Professors John Friedman and Joshua Goodman</i>	<b>Cambridge, MA</b> <i>July 2010 – July 2011</i>
<b>Institute for Defense Analyses — Cost Analysis and Research Division</b> <i>Research Assistant</i>	<b>Alexandria, VA</b> <i>June 2009 – June 2010</i>