

Wednesday WOW  
January 16, 2019

### Recent Publications by Krannert Management Faculty

**Mike Campion (OBHR)** - Bruning, P., & Campion, M. A. (2018). A role-resource approach-avoidance model of job crafting: A multi-method integration and extension of job crafting theory. *Academy of Management Journal*, 61, 499-522

**Mara Faccio (Finance)** - Taxes, Capital structure choices, and equity value. Mara Faccio and Jin Xu. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, June 2018, vol. 53(3), pp. 967-995

**Susan Lu (SCOM)** - Lu, S.F., H. Rui and A. Seidmann. 2018. "Does Technology Substitute for Nurses? Staffing Decisions in Nursing Homes", *Management Science*, 64(4), 1842-1859

Abstract: Over the past 10 years, many healthcare organizations have made significant investments in automating their clinical operations, mostly through the introduction of advanced information systems. Yet the impact of these investments on staffing is still not well understood. In this paper, we study the effect of information technology (IT)-enabled automation on staffing decisions in healthcare facilities. Using unique nursing home IT data from 2006 to 2012, we find that the licensed nurse staffing level decreases by 5.8% in high-end nursing homes but increases by 7.6% in low-end homes after the adoption of automation technology. Our research explains this by analyzing the interplay of two competing effects of automation: the substitution of technology for labor and the leveraging of complementarity between technology and labor. We also find that increased automation improves the ratings on clinical quality by 6.9% and decreases admissions of less profitable residents by 14.7% on average. These observations are consistent with the predictions of an analytical staffing model that incorporates technology adoption and vertical differentiation. Overall, these findings suggest that the impact of automation technology on staffing decisions depends crucially on a facility's vertical position in the local marketplace.

**Fabrice Lumineau (Strategy)** - Schilke O. & Lumineau F. 2018. "The Double-Edged Effect of Contracts on Alliance Performance." *Journal of Management*, 44(7): 2827-2858

Abstract: Despite substantial scholarly interest in the role of contracts in alliances, few studies have analyzed the mechanisms and conditions relevant to their influence on alliance performance. In this paper, we build on the information-processing view of the firm to study contracts as framing devices. We suggest that the effects of contracts depend on the types of provisions included and differentiate between the consequences of control and coordination provisions. Specifically, control provisions will increase the level of conflict between alliance partners, whereas coordination provisions will decrease such conflict. Conflict, in turn, reduces alliance performance, suggesting a mediated relationship between alliance contracts and performance. We also contribute to a better understanding of contextual influences on the consequences of contracts and investigate the interactions of each contractual function with both internal and external uncertainties. Key informant survey data on 171 alliances largely support our conceptual model

**Lin Nan (Accounting)** - "The Corporate Governance Roles of Information Quality and Corporate Takeovers," Jing Li, Lin Nan, and Ran Zhao. *Review of Accounting Studies*, September 2018, Volume 23, Issue 3, 1207-1240.

Abstract: We examine the corporate governance roles of information quality and the takeover market with asymmetric information regarding the value of the target firm. Increasing information quality improves the takeover efficiency however, a highly efficient takeover market also discourages the manager from exerting effort. We find that perfect information quality is not optimal for either current shareholders' expected payoff maximization or expected firm value maximization. Furthermore, current shareholders prefer a lower level of information quality than the level that maximizes expected firm value, because of a misalignment between current shareholders' value and total firm value. We also analyze the impact of antitakeover laws, and find that the passage of antitakeover laws may induce current shareholders to choose a higher level of information quality and thus increase expected firm value.

**Federico Rossi (Marketing)** - Rossi, Federico and Pradeep Chintagunta (2018) Price Uncertainty and Market Power in Retail Gasoline: The Case of an Italian Highway, *Marketing Science*, vol. 37 n. 5, pp. 753-770.

**Kelly Wilson (OBHR)** - Wilson, Naumann, Matta, Ilies, & Kossek (2018). Misery loves company: An investigation of couples' interrole conflict congruence. *Academy of Management Journal*, 61, 715-737.

Abstract: Previous research on interrole (family-to-work and work-to-family) conflict has demonstrated that such conflict is detrimental for outcomes in the work and home domains for employees and their family members. Although research has begun to integrate multiple parties into the interrole conflict literature, studies have overlooked how employee interrole conflict and partner interrole conflict can jointly influence employee outcomes. We advance work-family research by integrating balance theory with the interrole conflict literature to investigate dyadic interrole conflict congruence and challenge the implicit assumption that less interrole conflict always results in superior outcomes. Using a polynomial regression analysis of 141 employee and romantic partner dyads, we demonstrate that congruence between couples' experiences of family-to-work (but not work-to-family) conflict is positively associated with balance satisfaction, and ultimately employee job satisfaction and partner relationship satisfaction. Thus, when it comes to balance satisfaction and its downstream correlates, the harmful effects of high family-to-work conflict (FWC) are largely mitigated if an employee's partner shares a similarly high level of FWC, and the beneficial effects of low FWC are largely eliminated if an employee's partner does not share a similarly low level of FWC.

Link: <https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2016.0395>

*Thank you for self-reporting your publications to the Digital Footprint Committee and making this initiative work. We have received publication information for many papers. To deliver the information in an effective way, we will release the publication information gradually. At the beginning, we will release a list of published papers every week till we exhaust all the self-reported publication information. Meanwhile, we still need you, the faculty, to self-report when you*

*have a new manuscript accepted for publication. Please notify the Management Department Head Office at [krmgmth@purdue.edu](mailto:krmgmth@purdue.edu) when you have received an acceptance from any academic journal. In addition, please include the following information:*

1. *Title of article*
2. *Journal title*
3. *Abstract (and electronic link if available)*